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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
gant be made amenable to suit in the state where the cause of
action arises. The "estimate of inconveniences" mentioned 1 y
the' lae&-Chief Justice Stone in the International Shoe case 0
allows Louisiana to go beyond its pre-1950 claims in asserting
judicial jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
A. B. Atkins, Jr.
Confessions in Louisiana Law
CONFESSIONS DEFINED AND DISTINGUISHED FROM ADMISSIONS
Confessions are one species of admissions.' Thus, a discussion
of the subject of confessions requires discussion of admissions.
Admissions are commonly defined as direct or implied state-
ments by a party to a judicial proceeding of facts material
to the issue which, together with proof of other facts, tend to
establish his guilt or liability.2 When made extra-judicially, as
is usually the case where the question of their admissibility
arises, admissions are received in evidence as a time-honored
exception to the hearsay rule.3 According to Professor Wigmore,
hearsay evidence is excluded primarily because the person whose
statements are offered as evidence would otherwise, in effect, be
permitted to testify beyond the reach of cross-examination.
4
This exclusionary principle would seem to have no application
if the extra-judicial statements were offered against the party
who, having made them, may on trial explain or qualify their
meaning. This is normally the situation when a party's admis-
sion is offered in evidence against him. For this reason, too, other
dangers of admitting hearsay evidence-for example, that the
declarant was not under oath 5 or was not confronting the party
80. 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945), using Judge Learned Hand's language in
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).1. 1 GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 346, § 213 (16th ed.
1899); TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 241 (1952); 3 WIOMORE,
EVIDENCE 231, § 816 (3d ed. 1940).
2. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 507-08, § 265
(4th ed. 1935); 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 1081, § 645 (11th ed.
1935).
3. TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 231 (1952); 4 WIOMORE,
EVIDENCE 2-6, § 1048. See also Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921); Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the
Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 484, 564 (1937).
4. 4 WIflsORE, EVIDENCE 3-4, § 1048; 5 id. at 27, § 1365.
5. TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 218 (1952).
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against whom the statement is being offeredO-are not present
in the use of admissions. It has also been said that the hearsay
rule is relaxed for admissions because the probability is so great
that a person speaking against his own interest is speaking the
truth.7 No doubt a statement- against his interest would ordinar-
ily be entitled to greater weight than a self-serving or indiffer-
ent one. The force of this argument is squarely met, however,
by the well-established practice of receiving in evidence, as ad-
missions, statements which were clearly not against the party's
interest when he made them.8 Since confessions are a species of
admissions, the foregoing reasons for considering admissions an
exception to the hearsay rule apply similarly to confessions.9
A confession,, aS defined by Professor Wigmore, is an ac-
knowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal
case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential
part of it.10 The phrase "or of some essential part of it" makes this
definition appear broader in scope than that adopted by the
Louisiana legislature. Article 449 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure provides that; to amount to a confession, a statement
must be "an admission of guilt, not .. .an acknowledgment of
facts merely tending, to, establish guilt."'1 A literal interpretation
of this article would exclude from the category of confessions all
statements not. expressly containing the legal conclusion that the
party-is guilty of a crime.' 2 Furthermore, under Article 449, "the
term 'admission' is applied to those matters of fact which do not
involve criminal intent."'18 This might imply that a confession
must necessarily contain an admission of criminal intent, thus
6. 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE 27, § 1365.
7. 1 GREENLEAF. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 347, § 214 (16th ed.
1899). The Louisiana decision, State v. Alphonse, 34 La. Ann. 9 (1882), touches
on this subject at page 17, where it says: "As a general rule . . . the
confession of a party, when conclusively established, is regarded as the
highest species of' evidence. Indeed, when we reflect on the powerful
motives that would induce a guilty party to deny his guilt and seek to hide
his crime, we can.scarcely conceive of the possibility of an innocent person
of sound mind, falsely confessing his guilt of an offense with which he is
charged. Such confession, when made, might, therefore, be reasonably
viewed as the very strongest, if not conclusive evidence."
8. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 4, § 1048.
9. TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 241 (1952); 3 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 231, § 816. ,
10. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 238, § 821.
11. LA. R.S. § 15:449 (1950): "The term 'admission' is applied to those
matters of fact which do not involve criminal intent; the term 'confession'
is applied only to an admission of guilt, not to an acknowledgment of facts
merely tending to establish guilt."
12. The wording of the statute could well be revised by the legislature.
Quaere: Is it possible to confess a legal conclusion?
13. See note 11 supra.
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,rendering it impossible for one to confess to crimes not involv-
ing criminal intent, such as negligent injury14 and negligent
homicide.15 However, the article has been interpreted by the
courts to mean that a statement amounts to a confession when
the accused has by means of the statement admitted the exist-
ence of facts which unequivocally imply the presence of all the
essential elements of the crime charged.16 This definition is sub-
stantially the same as that advanced by Professor Wigmore' 7
and adopted by the majority of other jurisdictions. 5
The difference, therefore, between an admission and a con-
fession is that an admission is an acknowledgment of some fact
or circumstance which only tends to prove ultimate guilt or
liability, whereas a confession acknowledges a course of conduct
which irresistibly implies the existence of all the essential ele-
ments of a crime.'9
14. Art. 39, LA. CRIM. CODE (1942).
15. Art. 32, LA. CRIM. CODE (1942).
16. State v. Crittenden, 214 La. 81, 88, 36 So.2d 645, 647 (1948). (In this
case defendant was convicted of negligent homicide. Counsel for the state
contended that the rules applying to confessions do not apply to admissions
not involving the existence of a criminal intent. In its opinion setting aside
defendant's conviction, the court said: "In the present case, the accused
stated in the confessions that the deceased died as a result from a blow on
the neck delivered by the accused after he had been assaulted by the
deceased. The accused related how he had buried the body and concealed
its whereabouts by informing various parties that the deceased was visiting
relatives. At the time that the confessions were made the only evidence
pointing to the defendant's guilt was the fact that the body was found in a
grave covered with rubbish in close proximity to the house where the
defendant had resided, and the further fact that the deceased had dis-
appeared while the defendant was living with him. The confessions reflect
the existence of a criminal intent and they cannot be regarded as mere
exculpatory statements."); State v. Eisenhardt, 185 La. 308, 323, 169 So. 417,
422 (1936) (In defining a confession, the court quoted Corpus Juris and said:
"It [the confession] may be a naked statement by defendant that he is
guilty of the crime, or it may be a full statement of the circumstances of its
commission, including his part in it."); State v. Elmore, 177 La. 877, 880, 149
So. 507 (1933) (Statement by one that he and another conspired to rob
deceased and that such other in the argument or scuffle which ensued
killed deceased was considered a confession. The court said: ". . . it makes
no difference which one of the conspirators actually did the killing, all were
guilty of the homicide .. ").
17. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 238-245, § 821.
18. For both federal and state cases, see the list prepared in UNDERHILL,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 508, § 265, n. 1 (4th ed. 1935).
See also 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 954-58, § 580 (11th ed. 1935).
19. The following specific instances will illustrate generally the distinc-
tion between confessions and admissions:
Particular statements held admissions: State v. Guin, 212 La. 475, 32 So.
2d 895 (1947) (Murder prosecution. Signed statements by accused, in which
he detailed the manner in which the shooting occurred and in which he
admitted therein that the gun with which the deceased was killed was fired
while in his hands, was not a confession but an admission, for in the same
writing the defendants sought to show that the shooting was accidental.);
State v. Mattio, 212 La. 284, 303, 31 So.2d 801, 807 (1947) (". . . the statement
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PREREQUISITE TO ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS: VOLUNTARINESS
In general. Confessions are admitted into evidence under
rules not generally applicable to ordinary admissions. 2  They
have greater probative effect than admissions and are received
in evidence only after close scrutiny by the trial judge of the
circumstances in which they were made.2' Special caution in
given by the accused in the district attorney's office, although admitting the
fatal cutting of decedent, tends to justify and vindicate his act. It is not,
therefore, a true confession. ); State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 139 So. 463
(1931) (In prosecution for murder, evidence that the defendants talked
freely of the robbery prior to the murder, describing their flight from the
scene and the incidents leading to their arrest, was held to be an admission,
for none of the defendants had admitted the shooting of the murdered
victim.); State v. Glauson, 165 La. 270, 115 So. 484 (1928) (In prosecution for
felonious burning of another's building, testimony as to what one of the
defendants told witness shortly before the fire cannot be a confession but is
considered as an admission.); State v. Tatum, 162 La. 872, 874, 111 So. 264,
265 (1927) (In trial for possessing intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes,
the defendant's admission of his proprietorship of the raided premises and
ownership of the beer found was considered an admission and not a
confession. The court said: "Defendant's admission had reference only to his
ownership of the premises and beer. It was not a confession of guilt of any
crime .... "); State v. Munston, 35 La. Ann. 888 (1883) (The court, in
considering the silence as an admission, held the following charge to the
jury correct: "Standing silent when accused out of court is not presumed
as a confession of guilt . . . [but is] a circumstance which, like others,
[the jury] might consider and weigh."); State v. Crowley, 33 La. Ann. 782
(1881) (Murder prosecution. The court considered as an admission and
permitted a witness to testify that he heard accused make the statement, in
the presence of the other defendants, that they were going over the river to
rob the person whom afterwards they were charged with having murdered.);
State v. Gilcrease, 26 La. Ann. 622 623 (1874) (Defendant was charged with
the murder of his infant child. He made the statement: "Now don't you
never tell that I whipped the child Friday." The court considered this an
admission.)
Particular statements held confessions: State v. Crittenden, 214 La. 81,
36 So.2d 645 (1948) (Statement by accused that deceased died as a result of a
blow on the neck delivered by accused after accused had been assaulted by
deceased, was considered a confession. The court found that the statements
reflected the existence of a criminal intent.); State v. Elmore, 177 La. 877,
149 So. 507 (1933) (Statement by one that he and another conspired to rob
deceased and that such other in the argument which ensued killed deceased
was a confession and not an admission.); State v. Johnson, 149 La. 922. 927,
90 So. 257, 258 (1921) (A statement by accused that he had killed the
deceased because he thought deceased was going to raid his place was
considered a confession. The court said: "This confession is proof, not only
of defendant's motive, but of his intent.").
In State v. Picton, 51 La. Ann. 625, 628, 25 So. 375, 377 (1899), the court,
in holding that the statement was an admission, expressed very well the
distinction between an admission and a confession by saying: "A confession
is limited in its precise scope and meaning to the criminal act itself. It does
not apply to acknowledgments of fact merely tending to establish guilt,
since a damaging fact may be admitted without any intention to confess
guilt. . . . Where a person only admits certain facts, from which the jury
may or may not infer guilt, there is no confession."
20. See page 650 infra.
21. 1 GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENcE 346, § 213 (16th ed.
1899) ("The term 'confession,' as indicating a statement subjected to peculiar
rules for its use in criminal cases, seems in strictness to include only what
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using them is also justified by the fact that, since they represent
the accused's descriptive narratives of his own conduct, they are
more apt to be inaccurate than mere acknowledgments of the
existence of specific facts.22
There is disagreement among legal scholars over whether or
not any confession involuntarily made should be excluded from
evidence. Professor Wigmore has criticized the view that all
such confessions should be excluded as historically incorrect as
well as presently inadequate. 28 He would erect safeguards to pro-
tect the accused only from false confessions, the only valid rea-
son for excluding any confession being, in his opinion, that it
is not trustworthy as evidence.24 Other writers have favored the
exclusion of all involuntary confessions, even if trustworthy.25
They find in this approach an effective device for preventing
abuse of accused persons by possibly over-zealous law enforce-
ment officers, as well as a means of protecting the accused from
the effect of false confessions. 26 The guarantee that no person
in common usage the term implies, namely, a direct assertion by the
accused person of the doing of the act charged as a crime. It is for this
sort of a statement that the particular ensuing rules of caution and limi-
tation are intended,-the rule requiring some sort of corroboration, the rule
requiring freedom from the inducement of hope or fear, and the like. It
would seem to follow that these limiting rules about confessions do not
apply to conduct or statements of the accused, when offered against him,
other than those of the above sort.").
22. 3 WIOMORE, EVIDENcE 231, § 816.
23. Id. at 255, § 826.
24. Id. at 246, § 822.
25. For an excellent discussion of these two views, see McCormick,
The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. REV. 447, 451-57
(1938); Wicker, Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, 5
VAND. L. REV. 507-09 (1952).
26. Professor McCormick says: "It well may be that the adherence of
the courts to this form of statement of the confession-rule in terms of
'voluntariness' is prompted not only by a liking for its convenient brevity,
but also by a recognition that there is an interest here to be protected
closely akin to the interest of a witness or of an accused person which is
protected by the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Mc-
Cormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAs L. REV.
447, 452 (1938).
Dean Wicker says: "Doubt as to trustworthiness is probably the chief
principle behind the present rules relating to confessions, but this is not the
only principle. Another basic determinant is the protection of the individual
against physical and psychological abuses inherent in the traditional 'third
degree'. . . . Under this principle the protection of the privilege of the
individual to be free from illegal coercive police pressures may justify a
rejection for courtroom use of a confession which would otherwise be
relevant and competent. This is certainly one of the immediate objectives. A
long-range objective is discouragement of future official misconduct by refus-
ing to permit courtroom use of the fruits of past misconduct of police
officers." Wicker, Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, 5
VAND. L. REV. 507, 509 (1952).
See also McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admis-
sibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 239 (1946); Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949).
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should be compelled to be a witness against himself 7 also lends
weight to this view, which reflects an attitude of fairness to those
accused of crime.
The Louisiana decisions discussing admissibility of confes-
sions are couched in terms of voluntariness. 2 Some of the cases
applying the test of voluntariness are based upon the policy of
promoting fair law enforcement, 29 but the majority seem to rest
27. LA. CONST. Art. I, § 11.
28. Cases cited throughout this comment indicate that "voluntariness"
is the test used by the courts in determining the admissibility of a confession.
For specific cases, see State v. Alexander, 215 La. 245, 40 So.2d 232 (1949);
State v. Cook, 215 La. 163, 39 So.2d 898 (1949); State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869,
13 So.2d 249 (1943).
29. State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 985, 41 So.2d 848, 852 (1949). On
rehearing, the court, through Justice Fournet, said: "The rule now
universally obtaining in all countries where the common law prevails, that
a confession of a person accused of a crime is admissible in evidence only
if freely and voluntarily made, is the result of the humanitarian principles
evolved by courts during civilization's progress from the ancient harsh and
continental practice of putting a person charged with a crime to the torture
and breaking him piece by piece until the confession was obtained, regard-
less whether a crime had, in fact, been committed, or, if committed, had
been committed by the person being tortured.
"It was only natural, therefore, that this humane principle found Its
way into our system of law when our forefathers came to this country in
their quest for full liberty and that there was included in the Bill of Rights
to the Constitution of the United States the provision' that no one could be
compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself.
"The delegates representing the people of this state at the Constitutional
Convention of 1921 included in the Bill of Rights to this Constitution a
similar provision, and, in order to Ansure it would be beyond the power of the
legislature or the judiciary to depart from what was the then accepted
jurisprudence of this court, they added as a part of this same section,
Section 11 of Article 1, the provision that 'No person under arrest shall be
subjected to any treatment design7ed by effect on body or mind to compel
confession of crime; nor shall any confession be used against any person
accused of crime unless freely and voluntarily made.'
"In conformity therewith, the legislature of 1928. in adopting a Code of
Criminal Procedure, incornorated in its Articles 452 and 451 respectively
the following provisions: 'No person under arrest shall be subjected to any
treatment designed by effect on body or mind to compel a confession of
crime,' and 'Before what purposes [purports] to be a confession can be
introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and
voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation,
menaces, threats, inducements or promises.' "
In State v. Cook, 215 La. 163, 39 So.2d 898 (1949) and State v. Bessa,
115 La. 259. 38 So. 985 (1905), the court held that If the confession Is
voluntarily made, the judge has no right to exclude it even when "it Is
shown on its face to be false." And in State v. Scarbrough, 167 La. 484, 119
So. 523 (1929); State v. Jones, 174 La. 1074, 142 So. 693 (1932); and State v.
Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So.2d 249 (1943), the court held that a confession
which was not free and Voluntary was not admissible in evidence no
matter how true It may have been. The two latter situations seem to be
inconsistent with the view that confessions are excluded because they may
be untrustworthy as testimony, and the court in the Graffam case [202 La.
869, 889, 13 So.2d 249, 255 (1943)] quotes American Jurisprudence as follows:
"'A confession may be involuntary and yet be true. The courts, however,
exclude involuntary confessions as evidence without regard to their truth,
and in doing so they proceed not so much upon the ground of the unrell-
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upon the lack of trustworthiness of involuntary confessions.80
Perhaps it is felt that the same violence, threat, or promise which
would render law enforcement unfair also would render con-
fessions obtained by such means untrustworthy. The attempt to
place the voluntariness test on both the principle of trustworthi-
ness and the policy of fair law enforcement imparts a flexibility
to the test, and is perhaps the safest position to be taken.
An interesting question is whether or not the use of admis-
sions is restricted by the test of voluntariness. Article 454 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that
admissions obtained by threat or promise are not for that reason
inadmissible.81 No mention is made of corporal violence. Before
ability of the confession as upon a humanitarian ground. The rule is a
manifestation of a spirit of fairness toward the accused which is different
from the reason usually given that experience has shown that statements
made under compulsion are likely to be untrue'."
State v. Gilbert, 2 La. Ann. 244, 246 (1847) (In holding that a confession
made by a slave while undergoing corporal punishment could not be
received, the court said: "No rule is better understood than that which
excludes from evidence the confessions of a person accused of a crime, to
establish his own guilt, when made under the influence of threats or
violence. A conviction upon such evidence is abhorrent to the principles
of that humane system of laws from which we derive most of our rules of
criminal proceedings, and cannot be countenanced.").
30. State v. Richard, 223 La. 674, 66 So.2d 589 (1953); State v. Doyle,
146 La. 973, 84 So. 315 (1920) (The question is: Was the situation such that
there is a reasonable probability that the accused would make a false
confession?); State v. Gianfala, 113 La. 463, 482, 37 So. 30, 36 (1904) ("... one
of the main grounds of rejecting confessions-the danger of their not being
true. . . "); State v. Havelin, 6 La. Ann. 167, 169 (1851) ("... the only
-principle upon -which confessions are rejected in any case is, that they
may have been obtained by such promises or threats as render it uncertain
whether or not they are true."); State v. Jonas, 6 'La. Ann. 695, 698 (1851)
("The true ground upon which confessions, extorted by violence or induced
by promises, are excluded as evidence, is, that the violence and hope
destroy all confidence in the confessions. . . . Upon true principles, the
-objections should go rather to the credit of the confessions than to their
admission as evidence. We are not prepared to say the same strictness
should be observed, so as to exclude the confessions of slaves as evidence;
humanity and charity ought to be extended to them; but if their confessions
are obtained without a violation of either, and under such circumstances as
to force the belief that the confessions are true, they should be received
as evidence.").
31. LA. R.S. § 15:454 (1950): "The rule that a confession produced by
threat or promise is inadmissible In evidence does not apply to admissions
not involving the existence of a criminal Intent."
State v. Campbell, 219 La. 1040, 1043, 55 So.2d 238 (1951) (A bill of
exception was taken because'an oral admission of defendant was offered
In evidence without the showing that such was free and voluntary. To this
exception the court replied: "Counsel for the accused contends that It was
mandatory on the state to show that this statement was free and voluntary.
In analyzing what was said, what was done, and the locus of the interview,
we do not share such a view. What was said and done . . .was in no sense
a confession of the crime charged. Defendant admitted that he broke a pane
of glass on the church property. This was not a confession of guilt. It was
merely the acknowledgment of a fact tending to establish guilt. The
Louisiana Code of Criminal Law and Procedure speaks: 'The term "admis-
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the enactment of this article, the Supreme Court in 1925 em-
ployed the self-incrimination provision of the Louisiana Consti-
tution and held that an incriminating admission obtained by the
use of violence was not receivable in evidence.8 2 If this decision
is regarded as authoritative, and the negative implication of Ar-
ticle 454 is given effect, then admissions obtained by the use of
force are not admissible in evidence. In that event, perhaps there
should be some device whereby an accused might force the state
to make a preliminary showing that the admission offered in
sion" is applied to those matters of fact which do not involve criminal
intent . . .' and 'the term "confession" is applied only to an admission of
guilt, not to an acknowledgment of facts merely tending to establish
guilt.' Article 449. Here the Code in exact terms makes a distinction
between a confession and an admission."); State v. Picton, 51 La. Ann. 624,
628, 25 So. 375, 377 (1899) ("There was no confession of defendant, and being
none, there was no basis for urging exclusion of the testimony because
brought about by threats of prosecution on the one hand, or immunity
from prosecution on the other. . . . It has been held that the rule of
inadmissibilty of a confession procured by threat or promise does not apply
to admissions not involving the existence of a criminal intent.").
32. State v. Simpson, 157 La. 614, 617, 102 So. 810, 811 (1925): "It is
argued that the evidence which the defendant was compelled to give against
himself-his showing the deputy sheriff where to find the still and whiskey-
was not a confession of guilt, and was therefore not subject to the rule
forbidding involuntary confessions. If we were dealing only with the
common-law rule, nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, the argument in support
of the judge's ruling in this case might be sustained by quotations from
the decided cases and from the text-books on the law of evidence. But we
are controlled by the mandate in the Constitution, which is not limited
to a prohibition against involuntary confessions. The mandate is that-
"'No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself in a
criminal case or in any proceeding that may subject him to criminal
prosecution.' Article 1, § 11.
"To compel a person accused or suspected of a crime to tell or indicate
where evidence against him may be found is to compel him to give evidence
against himself. Evidence discovered in that way is, of itself and apart
from what was said or done by the person subjected to the threats or
punishment, admissible in evidence against him, notwithstanding the illegal
and reprehensible means of obtaining it. Therefore the fact that the deputy
sheriff found the still and the whiskey where he did find them, and the
articles themselves, were admissible -in evidence, for all that they were
worth, apart from any statement or indication which the defendant was
compelled to give as evidence against himself. But the statement or indica-
tion which the defendant was compelled to give, that he knew where the
still was, was not admissible in evidence. The Supreme Court of the United
States has affirmed the doctrine that any statement which an accused
person has been compelled to give is inadmissible as evidence against him
when he is put on trial, even though the statement was not a confession or
admission of guilt." The court then quoted from the case of Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
See also the case of State v. Hayes, 162 La. 310, 318, 110 So. 486, 489
(1926), in which the court, in holding that an incriminating admission, like
a confession, must be shown to have been voluntarily made, said: "Since,
when a confession is objected to as one not voluntarily made, the state
must show that it was so made, before it can be received in evidence, and
the defendant must be given an opportunity to offer in rebuttal his
evidence, we think the same rule governs the admissibility of incriminatory
statements, whether they are offered as substantive or impeaching evidence."
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evidence Was not extorted by violence.33 The Code of Criminal
Procedure provides for a preliminary determination of the ad-
missibility of confessions, 3 4 but is silent on the necessity of such
a determination when an admission is proffered.
Laying the foundation for the introduction of a confession.
When an attempt is made to introduce a confession into evidence,
the judge should retire the jury in order to ascertain in their
absence whether or not the confession was voluntarily made and
is thus admissible.35 The nature and probative effect of confes-
sions justify this time-consuming procedure.3 6 Any attempt to
get such evidence to the jury without this preliminary determi-
nation of its admissibility should be carefully guarded against.
Only such circumstances surrounding the making of the con-
fession as are relevant to the issue of voluntariness should be
considered by the judge in this hearing.3 7 All other questions,
33. Certainly all admissicns would not merit the time-consuming proce-
dure of a preliminary examination. Perhaps a prima facie case of violence
should be shown before a preliminary examination will be afforded for the
determination of their admissibility.
34. LA. R.S. § 15:451 (1950): "Before what purposes [purports] to be a
confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown
that it was free and voluntary ... "
35. The preliminary examination to determine the admissibility of the
confession is required only when an objection to the elect that the
confession is inadmissible because involuntary has been properly interposed.
See State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 730, 60 So.2d 208, 213 (1952) ("While it is
unquestionably the correct practice to require that the jury be withdrawn
when evidence is submitted for the purpose of laying the toundation for the
admission of a confession, reversible error does not necessarily occur by
permitting the jury to remain in the courtroom .. "); State v. Lanthier,
201 La. 844, 10 So.2d 638 (1942); State v. Madison, 47 La. Ann. 30, 33, 16 So.
566, 567 (1895) ("Counsel for the defendant urges in argument that no
confession should be admitted in evidence unless it is shown to have been
made voluntarily. It does not appear that the accused raised any objection
to the admissibility of the evidence and that he asked to have it excluded
from the consideration of the jury."); State v. Davis, 34 La. Ann. 351, 352-53
(1882) (". . . in the absence of timely objection from the accused, the court
will not exclude evidence of an alleged confession, because preliminary
proof was not offered, on the part of the State, to show that the confession
was made freely and voluntarily, unless it appear from the evidence itself
that the confession was obtained from the accused by means of promises or
threats, or, in other words, that it was not voluntary.
"At the instance of the accused, the court must exact proof to show
the nature and the circumstances of the confession, but not otherwise.").
36. See page 653 infra.
37. State v. Alexander, 215 La. 245, 40 So.2d 232 (1949); State v. Cook,
215 La. 163, 39 So.2d 898 (1949); State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So.2d 249
(1943); State v. Silsby, 178 La. 663, 674, 152 So. 323, 327 (1934) ("... by the
strict letter of the law, he should have been taken direct to the parish jail,
instead of to a police station or jail; but, if the confession be voluntary, the
place where it is made is of no consequence."); State v. Hughes, 155 La.
271, 99 So. 217 (1924); State v. Bessa, 115 La. 259, 38 So. 985 (1905); State v.
Bartley, 34 La. Ann. 147 (1882).
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including whether or not the confession was in fact made, 8 must
be left entirely to the jury.8 9
In Louisiana, the burden is on the prosecution to, prove that
the confession offered in evidence "was free and voluntary and
not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, men-
aces, threats, inducements or promises. 40 Without express leg-
islative authority, the court has declared on numerous occasions
that the state must prove this beyond a reasonable doubt.4' After
38. In State v. Hughes, 155 La. 271, 274, 99 So. 217 (1924), the court
said: "The defendant denied that he made a confession ...but whether or
not the confession was made was a question of fact for the jury to determine.
It was the duty of the court to ascertain if the alleged confession was freely
and voluntarily made, and, if so, to admit the testimony and leave the
determination of all other facts in relation thereto to the jury."
39. State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85 (1928). In this case the-court
held that the objection that defendant's statement was not admissible as a
confession because not Incriminatory went merely to the effect of the
statement and not to the admissibility thereof.
In State v. Cook, 215 La. 163, 29 So.2d 898 (1949) and State v. Bessa, 115
La. 259, 38 So. 985 (1905), the court held that if a confession is voluntarily
made, the judge has no right to exclude it even when "it is shown on its
face to be false." And in State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So.2d 249 (1943)
and State v. Scarbrough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928), the court held that
a confession which was not free and voluntary was not admissible in
evidence no matter how true it may have been. These are factors to be
-considered solely by the jury.
40. LA. R.S. § 15:451 (1950): "Before what purposes [purports] to be a
confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown
that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear,
duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises." See also
State v. Richard, 223 La. 674, 66 So.2d 589 (1953); State v. Green, 221 La. 713,
60 So.2d 208 (1952); State v. Lewis, 175 La. 696, 144 So. 423 (1932); State v.
Johnson, 30 La. Ann. 881 (1878). This view as to the burden of proof applies
to cases where it does not appear whether or not the confession was made
to persons in authority or where it appears that the confessions were made
to persons not in authority [State v. Doiron, 150 La. 550, 90 So. 920 (1922);
State v. Young, 52 La. Ann. 478, 27 So. 50 (1899) (to mob)]; and also in cases
where the confessions appear to have been made to persons in authority.
[State v. Lewis, 175 La. 696, 144 So. 423 (1932) (to coroner); State v. Berry,
50 La. Ann. 1309, 24 So. 329 (1898) (to constable); State v. Auguste, 50 La.
Ann. 488, 23 So. 612 (1898) (to deputy sheriffs); State v. Garvey, 28 La. Ann.
925 (1876) (to chief of police); State v. Nelson, 3 La. Ann. 497 (1848) (slave to
the son of his master)].
41. State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208 (1952); State v. Jugger, 217
La. 687, 47 So.2d 46 (1950); State v. Joseph, 217 La. 175, 46 So.2d 118 (1950);
State v. Wilson, 217 La. 470, 46 So.2d 738 (1950); State v. Wilson, 214 La. 317,
324-25, 37 So.2d 804, 806 (1948) (The court, after quoting Article 351, said:
"This court has construed that article of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to mean that before what purports to be a confession can be introduced
in evidence it must be shown, not only affirmatively but by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the
influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or
promises."); State v. Ellis, 207 La. 812, 22 So.2d 181 (1945); State v. Graffam,
202 La. 869, 13 So.2d 249 (1943); State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910
(1940).
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the prosecution has offered its evidence, 42 the defense may cross-
examine the prosecution's witnesses and offer evidence on its own
behalf that-the confession was' not voluntary.43 The accused may
take ihe stand for the purpose of contradicting the state's ev-
idence without subjecting himself to cross-examination on the
whole case. 44
42. The state must offer witnesses to testify that the accused had been
offered no threats or promises or that the confession was voluntary. See
State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 735, 60 So.2d 208, 215 (1952) (The court, speaking
through Justice McCaleb, said: "It was incumbent upon the prosecution to
produce the available witnesses who participated in the questioning of defen-
dant for the purpose of obtaining a confession, in order tor the court to have
all the facts before it."); State v. Thomas, 208 La. 548, 23 So.2d 212 (1945);
State v. Lanthier, 201 La. 844, 10 So.2d 638 (1942); State v. Silsby, 176 La.
727, 736, 146 So. 684, 686 (1933) ("So it seems hardly necessary to say that in
this case every police officer who had the defendant in charge, from the
time of his arrest to the time of his alleged confession, and everyone who
had aught to do with the receiving of the alleged confession, was called to
testify that the confession was freely given, without violence, duress, threat,
or promise, of any kind."); State v. Miller, 42 La. Ann. 1186, 8 So. 309 (1890);
State v. Platte, 34 La. Ann. 1061 (1882).
43. A witness by whom a confession is to be established must first be
asked whether it was voluntary. At this point the defendant cannot object
and offer another witness to show that the first had previously stated that
threats or promises had been used to obtain the confession. The defendant
must wait until the prosecution has laid the foundation and may then offer
proof to impeach the statements of the witness for the state. See State v.
Thomas, 208 La. 548, 23 So.2d 212 (1945); State v. Lanthier, 201 La. 844, 850,
10 So.2d 638, 640 (1942) ("If the accused is compelled to withhold his
evidence tending to establish that the confession is not free and voluntary
until such time as he offers his proof in defense, there would be very few
cases where the purported confession would not get before the jury, because
certainly the State is not going to offer evidence to prove that the confession
was not free and voluntary."); State v. Michel, 111 La. 434, 437, 35 So. 629, 630
(1904) ("If there was anything about the place at which this confession is
said to have been made, or in regard to the condition under which it was
obtained, it devolved upon the defense to bring out the facts by needful
cross-examination."); State v. Miller, 42 La. Ann. 1186, 8 So. 309 (1890); State
v. Platte, 34 La. Ann. 1061, 1062 (1882) ("When the state offers to make such
proof [of voluntary character of the confession], the issue as to the char-
acter of the confession is properly raised, and both sides have the right to
be heard on this issue. The inquiry, on a point of such vital importance to
an accused, should be free and full, and is not to be closed at the very
instant that the state manages to eke out from the prosecuting witness,
that she, the witness, had made no threats or promises, and all opportunity
denied to the other party to be heard.")
,-= 44. In State v. Thomas, 208 La. 548, 554, 23 So.2d 212, 214 (1945), the
court said: "In determining whether the confession is free and voluntary,
the judge, in the absence of the jury, necessarily can admit only testimony
relating to such issue. Testimony of that nature has no direct bearing on the
guilt or innocence of the accused; it concerns solely facts occurring sub-
sequent to the time of the commission of the crime. From this it follows,
we think, that when a defendant is placed on the stand for the purpose of
traversing the testimony of the state witnesses that a confession was free
and voluntary, he is not undergoing the examination-in-chief contemplated
by the referred to Article 376."- Article 376 provides 'that a witness who
testiffes-to a single fact -inhis examination-in-chief may be cross-examined
upon the whole case.
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MEANING OF THE TERM "VOLUNTARY"
In general. A voluntary confession is one that the accused
made of his own free will.45 The Louisiana courts state that a
confession is deemed involuntary if influence of any degree has
been exerted on the accused to obtain it, whether in the form of
threats, promises, or violence.46 If the underlying theory of the
voluntariness test were that only untrustworthy confessions are
not admissible, then it would seem that no confession obtained by
influencing the accused's free will would be inadmissible unless
the influence had been sufficiently strong to render the confession
untrustworthy. A few Louisiana cases follow this approach.17
But the majority position is in favor of excluding confessions
obtained by the exertion of any influence on the accused's free
will.4 One explanation advanced for this is that the courts are
not equipped to measure the effects of various influences upon the
mind of the accused. 49 Such reasoning is not persuasive, since
courts frequently gauge the effect of certain acts or events on
persons' minds.,"
Physical and mental condition of confessor. The age, intel-
ligence, and physical and mental condition of the accused are
relevant factors in determining whether or not a confession made
45. For a discussion of this see 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
980, § 592 (11th ed. 1935).
46. State v. Richard, 223 La. 674, 66 So.2d 589 (1953); State v. Ellis, 207 La.
812, 22 So.2d 181 (1945); State v. Lanthier, 201 La. 844, 10 So.2d 638 (1942);
State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940); State v. Lewis, 175 La. 696,
144 So. 423 (1932); State v. Canton, 131 La. 255, 59 So. 202 (1912); State v.
Young, 52 La. Ann. 478, 27 So. 50 (1899).
47. State v. Ross, 212 La. 405, 31 So.2d 842 (1947); State v. Doyle, 146 La.
973, 84 So. 315 (1920); State v. Williams, 129 La. 215, 217, 55 So. 769 (1911)
("The true test seems to be: 'Was the inducement of a nature calculated,
under the circumstances, to induce a confession, irrespective of its truth
or falsity?' Wigmore, Evidence, vol. 1, § 832."); State v. Gianfala, 113 La.
463, 37 So. 30 (1904); State v. Jonas, 6 La. Ann. 695 (1851) (In this case, the
court said that if confessions were received under such circumstances as
to force belief that they are true, they ought to be received as evidence;
that, upon true principle, the objection that the confession was extorted by
violence or inducements should go rather to the credit of the confession
than its admissibility.); State v. Havelin, 6 La. Ann. 167, 169 (1851) ( . . the
only principle upon which confessions are rejected in any case is, that they
may have been obtained by such promises or threats as render it uncertain
whether or not they are true.")
48. See note 46 supra.
49. See note 46 supra.
50. The courts, for example, rest their judgments on findings of subjec-
tive facts in cases involving mental pain and anguish [Spearman v. Toye
Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 164 La. 677, 114 So. 591 (1927)], freedom of consent
to marriage by the parties [Art. 91, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. See Grundmeyer
v. Sander, 175 La. 189, 143 So. 45 (1932); Fowler v. Fowler, 131 La. 1088, 60
So. 694 (1913); Lacoste v. Guidroz, 47 La. Ann. 295, 16 So. 836 (1895)A and
defense of another in tort [Goodwin v. Beene, 147 La. 177, 84 So. 579 (1920)].
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by him was voluntary.51 The reasons for this are obvious, and the
extent to which these factors should be considered naturally
varies with different factual situations. The fact that a person is
a minor 52 or mentally deficient 53 does not by itself render the
confession he has made inadmissible. The situation from which
the confession arose must be weighed in the light of the probable
51. State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 981, 41 So.2d 848, 851 (1949) ("While
there can be little doubt that the insistence of the officer to confess because
'I have got you in the palm of my hand' would have influenced a man of
judgment to some extent, an even more vigorous view of the declaration
must be applied here-for it is apparent that appellant, being but 16
years of age, was mentally immature despite the fact that he was fully
developed from a physical standpoint." Justice McCaleb explained his
position by footnoting the remark, ". . . that, in view of the fact that ap-
pellant is a boy 16 years of age, the chances of influencing him were much
greater than in the case of an adult." 215 La. 974, 981, n. 4, 41 So.2d 848, 851,
n. 4 (1949)); State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 889, 13 So.2d 249, 255 (1943) ("Under
the facts presented by this record we are constrained to hold that defen-
dant's confession was not freely and voluntarily made. The situation of the
defendant, the nature of his wound, the condition of acute shock from which
he was suffering, his weakness resulting from the loss of blood, and the effect
of the morphine and other treatment that was administered, or being
administered to him, necessarily, overthrows any possible implication that
his statement to Detective Schwehm in response to the detective's questions
could have been the result of a purely voluntary mental action." The court
explained that: "It is not enough that the confession was not induced by a
promise or a threat in order to prove that it was voluntarily made. It is
voluntary in law if, and only if, it is voluntary in fact."); State v. Bernard,
160 La. 9, 11, 106 So. 656, 657 (1925) (Fact that defendant was "an ignorant
country negro" was considered in -determining if the confession was vol-
untary. In that case the court said, "The language and conduct of the
officers, considering the situation and character of the defendant, and the
circumstances under which the defendant was called upon to disclose what
he knew about the offense, must be held to be such 'treatment designed by
effect on body and mind to compel a confession of crime.'"); State v. Phelps,
138 La. 11, 69 So. 856 (1915) (The fact that a colored boy was sixteen years
of age and not possessed of normal intelligence was considered in determin-
ing whether his confession was free and voluntary, but did not make the
confession inadmissible of itself.); State v. Auguste, 50 La. Ann. 488, 491, 23
So. 612, 613 (1898) ("And whether it was so made [without the application
of hope or fear by any other person] or not is to be determined upon
consideration of the age, situation, and character of the person, and the
circumstances under which it was made.").
52. State v. Phelps, 138 La. 11, 69 So. 856 (1915) (defendant was a sixteen
year old Negro boy).
53. State v. Bernard, 160 La. 9, 106 So. 656 (1925) (defendant was an
"ignorant country negro"); State v. Babineaux, 146 La. 290, 292, 83 So. 558,
559 (1920) (The court, considering the mental condition of the defendant,
said: "While the accused, who was sick, testifies to his having been out of
his head when he made the confession, and the person to whom he made
it says that the accused was very sick-said he had pneumonia-the fact
remains that he was not so far out of his head as not to have been able to
make the confession; and there is no pretense that he was induced to make
it by any promise or prompting from anybody."); State v. Phelps, 138 La.
11, 13, 69 So. 856, 857 (1915) (The sixteen year old defendant did not possess
normal intelligence. The court said: "We have no doubt that the trial judge
gave due consideration to the mental caliber of the youth, in determining
whether his confessions were made under an undue influence. But the fact
that he is a colored boy only sixteen years of age and of less than normal
intelligence did not, of itself, render confessions inadmissible in evidence.").
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strength of the accused's will in determining whether his will,
at the time of confessing, was free or not.54
The excitement or nervousness of the confessor will not be
considered by the court in determining the admissibility of a
confession made while he was in that condition.55 Such a mental
condition would seem to detract from the reliability of statements
made during its existence, and would certainly seem relevant in
inquiring into the probable effect of external influences on the
accused's will. But the accused's excitement usually comes from
within himself as a result of the situation in which he finds him-
self, without inducements directed at his free will by other
persons,"6 and this condition does not render his confession in-
voluntary. If the nervousness or excitement were directly pro-
duced by extraneous pressure exerted by another person for the
purpose of obtaining a confession, it would very probably be held
that the confession so obtained is involuntary and not admissible.
The intoxication of the accused at the time of making his
confession does not by itself render the confession inadmissible."
His intoxication is material in inquiring into the weight his confes-
sion should be accorded by the jury, but not in deciding its admis-
54. See note 51 supra.
55, State v. Doyle, 146 La. 973, 992, 84 So. 315, 322 (1920) (The court, In
refusing to exclude a confession because of testimony indicating that the
defendant was laboring under an "emotional strain" or his mental condition
was "not that of an ordinary sane man," said: "But the normal man in
civilized life would probably exhibit some emotion in confessing a murder,
and thereby subjecting himself to the penalty of death; and, if the normal
man's mental state is affected, as it surely is, by the condition in which he
finds himself, then the abnormal becomes the normal."); State v. Jones, 127
La. 694, 53 So. 959 (1911) (The court held that the mere fact that the
confession was given in the course of an angry tirade of jealousy will not
of necessity render a confession involuntary.); State v. Pamelia, 122 La. 207,
47 So. 508 (1908) (A confession given while defendant was under arrest and
while under great excitement and nervousness was-admitted by the court.);
State v. Jones, 47 La. Ann. 1524, 18 So. 515 (1895) (The court held that
excitement and nervousness on the part of the accused at the time he made
the confession to the jailer did not render it involuntary when there was no
offer of violence or threats from any source whatever.).
56. See note 55 supra.
57. State v. Alexander, 215 La. 245, 251, 40 So.2d 232, 234 (1949) ("A review
of the authorities brings us to the conclusion that the fact of the intoxicated
condition of the accused at the time of making the confessions does not,
unless such intoxication goes to the extent of mania, affect the admissibility
of evidence of such confessions, if they were otherwise voluntary."); State
v. Hogan, 117 La. 863, 867, 42 So. 352, 353 (1906); State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann.
1309, 1315, 24 So. 329, 331 (1898). In both the Berry and Hogan cases, the
court quoted Wharton and said: "'The mere fact of intoxication, unless
amounting to mania, does not exclude a confession made during its continu-
ance, even though the intoxication was induced by a police officer, who
sought in this way to induce the prisoner to confess. Confession, however,
produced by intoxication, is a fact for the jury, tending to discredit
the confession'.").
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sibility.58 The fact that the intoxicants were furnished by the
officer having the accused in custody does not affect the admis-
sibility of his confession, 9 unless they were furnished by the
officer (or some other person) for the purpose of obtaining the
confession. In the latter event, the court would undoubtedly take
the opportunity of discouraging such a practice by holding the
confession so obtained inadmissible. If the accused were intoxi-
cated to the point of mania when he confessed, indications are
that his condition would be viewed differently from that of mere
intoxication." Mere intoxication would probably not result in
automatic exclusion of the confession, but it would have consider-
able weight as evidence of the strength of the accused's will in
relation to external influences.
Hope or fear not produced by other persons. The influence
which overcomes the will of the accused and leads the court to
exclude the confession must be external, and not a result of the
mere operations of his own mind.61 If hope or fear is not induced
by third persons, the court will not hold the confession invol-
untary. 62 The inducement to confess must come. from some ex-
ternal source and the fact that a prisoner may of his own motion
conclude that it will be advantageous to him to confess is im-
material. Where the violence used or threats made were for a
purpose other than to induce a confession, and the accused was or
as a reasonable man should have been aware of this fact, then the
58. See cases cited in note 57 supra.
59. See cases cited in note 57 supra. See also State v. Eisenhardt, 185 La.
308, 335, 169 So. 417, 425-26 (1936) (The court, in refusing to exclude a
confession when alcohol was given to the accused by an officer, said: "The
record is very far from showing that the defendants were plied with
alcohol to affect them so as to more readily induce confessions during the
interview with the district attorney and his assistant, as inferred in the
brief of defendants. The facts are that during this interview the defendants
themselves asked for a drink. A small drink was given each; and, after the
interview, they asked if they could have what was left in the bottle, about
a drink, and it was given them.").
60. See cases cited in notes 57 and 59 supra.
61. State v. Griffin, 48 La. Ann. 1409, 20 So. 905 (1896) (A confession to
one who informed the defendant that he was a newspaper man seeking
a statement for publication, and who used no violence and made no threats
or promises but, on the contrary, informed the defendant that he could do
nothing for her in the way of immunity from punishment, was held vol-
untary. The court held that the mere hope of immunity is not such an
inducement as to make the confession inadmissible.); State v. Havelin, 6 La.
Ann. 167, 169 (1851) (The court held the confession admissible when brought
about by mere hope resulting from a conversation with a policeman who
told the accused he had no power to make any promises and the court
said ". . . that a mere hope resulting from a conversation, in which a promise
was neither expressed nor implied, is not sufficient [to exclude a confes-
sion].").
62. See note 61 supra.
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courts will consider the confession voluntarily given.63 For
example, a confession has been admitted in evidence where the
violence or threat was used in order to enforce discipline in jail6 4
or to reprimand an insolent prisoner. 65
Confessions made while in custody or under arrest. The Loui-
siana courts, 66 along with other state courts, 7 have always held
that the mere fact that a confession is made while the accused
is confined under arrest or in police custody is not sufficient in
itself to affect its admissibility. There must be something more,
some inducement held out or influence exerted to overcome the
free will of the prisoner.6 8 There is nothing in the fact of arrest,
as such, which tends to produce an untrue confession of guilt or
to violate the policy of encouraging fair law enforcement. If there
63. State v. Lamotte, 168 La. 837, 123 So. 591 (1929); State v. Thomas,
161 La. 1010, 109 So. 819 (1926).
64. State v. Thomas, 161 La. 1010, 1014, 109 So. 819, 821 (1926) ("The mere
incident that the jailer stuck a guli in defendant's cell, and told him that if
he did not clean up his cell he would come in and chastise him, did not
constitute force or threats designed to compel or induce a confession, but
was clearly intended as a firm means of enforcing prison discipline and
sanitary conditions in the jail.").
65. State v. Lamotte, 168 La. 837, 841, 123 So. 591, 592 (1929) (The only
force used upon the defendant was that of the constable. He slapped the
defendant just before locking him in the city jail because he thought the
defendant was being insolent. The court said: "While the constable was not
justified in his action, yet his conduct was so disconnected with the making
of the confessions to the police officers that we think that, resting upon
obviously distinct motives, it could not have influenced them, and hence
this conduct should not have the effect of vitiating the confessions.").
66. State v. Scriber, 178 La. 237, 151 So. 192 (1933); State v. Brown, 166
La. 43, 116 So. 588 (1928); State v. Seminary, 165 La. 67, 115 So. 370 (1928);
State v. Garon, 161 La. 867, 109 So. 530 (1926); State v. Bailey, 146 La. 624,
83 So. 854 (1920); State v. Doyle, 146 La. 973, 84 So. 315 (1920); State v.
McGuire, 146 La. 49, 83 So. 374 (1919); State v. Rugero, 117 La. 1040, 42 So.
495 (1906); State v. Baudoin, 115 La. 773, 40 So. 42 (1905); State v. Lewis, 112
La. 872, 36 So. 788 (1904); State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 24 So. 329 (1898);
State v. Jones, 47 La. Ann. 1524, 18 So. 515 (1895); State v. Johnson, 47 La.
Ann. 1225, 17 So. 789 (1895); State v. Revells, 35 La. Ann. 302 (1883); State
v. Alphonse, 34 La. Ann. 9 (1882); State v. Simon, 15 La. Ann. 568 (1860);
State v. Hash, 12 La. Ann. 895 (1857).
67. For cases on this see 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 1023,
§ 610, n. 6 (l1th ed. 1935); 3 WGMORE, EVIDENCE 31.1, § 851, n. 1.
68. In State v. Auguste, 50 La. Ann. 488, 491, 23 So. 612, 613 (1898), the
court said, "The mere fact that a confession is made to a police officer, or
other official, while the accused is under arrest in or out of prison, or was
drawn out by questions, does not, it is true, necessarily render the confession
involuntary, but such imprisonment or interrogation, and the circumstances
and surroundings of the accused at the time, should be taken into careful
account in determining whether or not the statements of the prisoner were
voluntary." (Italics supplied.) And in State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 1314,
24 So. 329, 331 (1898), the court, with reference to confessions made by
prisoners to parties arresting them, said, "The fact that a confession was
made to such persons and under such circumstances, throws upon courts
the duty of very- closely scrutinizing the conduct of these officials, and
making sure that the instrumentalities intended merely for the vindication
of the law should not be converted into engines of oppression or wrong."
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were, few confessions would ever reach the jury, since they are
usually made after the prisoner is under arrest. Although no Loui-
siana decisions could be found on this point, it seems that since
the only test of admissibility is that of voluntariness, a confession
would be admitted even when made while the accused was il-
legally arrested.6 9
Even the fact that the accused was shackled, handcuffed, or
tied after the arrest is held not to be enough to deprive the
confession of its voluntary character. ° The result is different if
the prisoner was shackled, handcuffed, or tied for the purpose of
causing him pain, for such treatment is a violation of both the
fair law enforcement policy and the principle of trustworthi-
ness.
71
The decisions dealing with the interrogation of an accused
being held incommunicado reveal that the courts look into the
circumstances of each particular case and regard such practice as
only one element to be considered in determining whether or
not the confession was voluntarily given. 2
Until 1943, both state 8 and federal courts 74 were in agree-
ment that delay in taking an accused before a committing magis-
trate was only one of several factors to consider in determining
voluntariness. In 1943, however, in McNabb v. United States,75
the United States Supreme Court held that a confession obtained
during a delay in arraignment contrary to express statutory
provision was automatically inadmissible, regardless of its volun-
tariness.7 6 The purpose of the McNabb rule was to prescribe
69. This rule has been followed in other jurisdictions. For cases see 2
WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 1024, § 610, n. 7 (11th ed. 1935).
70. State v. Joseph. 217 La. 175, 46 So.2d 118 (1950); State v. Holmes, 205
La. 730, 18 So.2d 40 (1944); State v. White, 156 La. 770, 101 So. 136 (1924);
State v. McGuire, 146 La. 49, 83 So. 374 (1919); State v. Rugero, 117 La. 1040,
42 So. 495 (1906). Moreover, the fact that the accused was placed in the
stocks for safekeeping did not render his confession inadmissible. State v.
Nelson, 3 La. Ann. 497 (1848).
71. State v. Murphy, 154 La. 190, 97 So. 397 (1923); State v. Albert, 50 La.
Ann. 481, 23 So. 609 (1898).
72. State v. Jugger, 217 La. 687, 47 So.2d 46 (1950); State v. Roberson,
157 La. 974, 103 So. 283 (1925).
73. INBAU & REID, LIDE DECTECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 209 (3d ed.
1953).
74. Zang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Hardy v. United
States, 186 U.S. 224 (1902); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897);
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
75. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
76. Id. at 344-45. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated the circumstances under
which the confessions were secured and explained the consequences as
follows: "The circumstances in which the statements admitted In evidence
against the petitioners were secured reveal a plain disregard of the duty
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certain "civilized standards" for federal law enforcement officers.77
Although the Supreme Court's ruling in this case only affected
the use of confessions illegally obtained by federal officers and
placed no restriction upon the use of such confessions obtained
by state or local officers,78 there was some speculation at the
time whether or not the state courts would be so influenced
by the decision that they would adopt the same doctrine.79 It has
enjoined by Congress upon federal law officers. Freeman and Raymond
McNabb were arrested in the middle of the night at their home. Instead
of being brought before a United States Commissioner or a judicial officer,
as the law requires, in order to determine the sufficieiicy of the justification
for their detention, they were put in a barren cell and kept there for
fourteen hours. For two days they were subjected to unremitting question-
ing by numerous officers. Benjamin's confession was secured by detaining
him unlawfully and questioning him continuously for five or six hours. The
McNabbs had to submit to all this without the aid of friends or the benefit
of counsel. The record leaves no room for doubt that the questioning of the
petitioners took place while they were in the custody of the arresting
officers and before any order of commitment was made. Plainly, a conviction
resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the
procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand
without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience
of law. Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured.
But to permit such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the
Federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into
law."
Although the above excerpt stresses both the unlawful detention and the
coercive effects of prolonged incommunicado questioning, the Court in
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948) pointed out the primary
consideration: ". .. a confession is inadmissible if made during illegal
detention due to the failure promptly to carry'a prisoner before a committing
magistrate, whether or not 'the confession is the result of torture, physical
or psychological.' "
The McNabb rule was limited in United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65
(1944). The court held admissible a voluntary confession obtained a few
minutes after arrest, even though the accused was subsequently detained
illegally for eight days before being arraigned. Thus, a confession made
during a period of legal detention should not be excluded on account of a
subsequent unwarranted delay in arraignment.
Some excellent discussions of the McNabb rule can be found in the
following: Inbau, The Confession Dilemma In the United States Supreme
Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442 (1948); McCormick, Some Problems and Develop-
ments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 239 (1946);
Wicker. Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 507 (1952); Note, The McNabb Rule Transformed, 47 COL. L. REV. 1214
(1947).
77. Wicker, Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, 5
VAND. L. REv. 507, 514 (1952): "The rationale of this new federal rule is that
of implementing the otherwise unenforcible arraignment statutes by giving
to a prisoner, whose rights and privileges thereunder have been violated,
the remedy of barring the evidence secured in such a manner, thereby
depriving federal law-enforcing officers of the fruits of their wrongdoing."
78. The Fourteenth Amendment does not require the exclusion of a
confession merelv because it was obtained during an illegal detention. Thus
the decision in the McNabb case does not impose a limitation upon criminal
trials in state courts. See INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTER-
ROOATION 209 (3d ed. 1953) and Wicker, Some Developments in the Law
Concerning Confessions, 5 VAND. L. REV. 507 (1952).
79. For a list of the various federal and state statutes requiring prompt
arraignment of a suspect after his arrest, see McNabb v. United States, 318
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developed that most of the state courts have rejected the McNabb
rule.80 In 1952 the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly rejected
the strict rule of the McNabb case,8 ' although Louisiana has a
statute imposing upon law enforcement officials the duty of
bringing arrested persons before a committing magistrate "with-
out unnecessary delay."8 2
Confessions obtained by physical force. One of the clearest
cases of interference with the accused's free will which will
vitiate a confession is corporal violence. All courts, both federal
and state, seem to be in general agreement upon this rule.18 There
are numerous Louisiana cases where physical violence was admin-
istered to an accused and in each case the resulting confession
was deemed involuntary and excluded.8 4 Whether the violence
was employed by a private individual 5 or by a person in au-
thority" is immaterial-the confession obtained is inadmissible
in either case. Confessions obtained by such methods as striking
or whipping are excluded.8 7 Solitary and "sweatbox" confinement
U.S. 332, 342 (1943); Note. Illegal Detention and the Admissibility of Confes-
sions, 53 YALE L.J. 758, 759 (1944). For a discussion of the legislative history
of the federal statutes, see Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442, 455-59 (1948).
80. For a list of the various state decisions to this effect, see INBAU &
REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 210, n. 157 (3d ed. 1953);
Wicker. Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 507, 515, n. 28 (1952).
81. State v. Solomon, 222 La. 269, 62 So.2d 481 (1952).
82. LA. R.S. § 15:79, 80 (1950).
83. For a collection of cases involving a variety of forms of corporal
violence, see McCormick, Some. Problems and Developments in the Admis-
sibilityj of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. Rr~v. 239. 241-42 (19A6); Note, 43 HARV. L.
REv. 617 (1930); Note, 24 A.L.R. 703 (1923). See also 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES 1016-1022, §§ 607-08 (11th ed. 1935).
84. State v. Scarbrough, 167 La. 484. 1.19 So. 523 (1929) (Defendant was
confined with scanty food. no heat, snd little clothing. Requiting confession
was excluded.); State v. Murphy, 154 La. 190. 97 So. 397 (1923) (Defendants
were blindfolded, ropes were put around their necks, and severe punishment
was inflicted on them for five hours. Confessions were excluded.); State v.
Young, 52 La. Ann. 478, 27 So. 50 (1899) (A confession to a body of private
citizens which had the accused in close custody with a rode around his
neck was held involuntary.); State v. Albert, 50 La. Ann. 481, 23 So. 609 (1898)
(Handcuffs were placed tightly on accused for purpose of extorting a
confession; excluded.); State v. Revells, 34 La. Ann. 381 (1882) (Accused, a
boy about eighteen years of age, was bound by tying a rope around his neck
and arms. Confession excluded.); State v. Gilbert, 2 La. Ann. 244 (1847) (The
court held that a confession made by a slave while undergoing corporal
punishment is Inadmissible.).
85. State v. Young, 52 La. Ann. 478, 27 So. 50 (1899); State v. Revells, 34
La. Ann. 381 (1882).
86. State v. Scarbrough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1929); State v. Murphy,
154 La. 190, 97 So. 397 (1923); State v. Albert, 50 La. Ann. 481, 23 So. 609
(1898); State v. Gilbert, 2 La. Ann. 244 (1847).
87. State v. Murphy, 154 La. 190, 97 So. 397 (1923).
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have also served as bases for the exclusion of confessions from
evidence. 88
Confessions obtained by threats. Confessions obtained by
threats are usually inadmissible in evidence. What constitutes a
threat that will render a confession inadmissible depends upon
the circumstances of each case.89 However, it seems that any
threat which can reasonably be said to have placed the accused
in fear that his life or liberty would be in danger if he did not
confess will render his confession inadmissible °0 The courts will
not conclude that a confession has been induced by threats unless
the person making the threats appears to have the power to carry
them out. A threat of mob violence,91 a threat to strike, whip, or
88. State v. Scarbrough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1929) (Defendant was
left for four days in an antiquated, unheated, windowless jail inhabited by
rats. Confession was inadmissible.).
89. State v. Newton, 173 La. 382, 384, 137 So. 69, 70 (1931) ("One of the
officers, in the course of the examination, told Edwards [the defendant] that
he would try to get an order of court to have the bullet removed, [from
the body of the defendant] and sent off, meaning, of course, though not
saying it, to have it ascertained by an expert, whether or not the bullet came
from the pistol of Nixon [the deceased]." The court held this was equivalent
to a threat and considered this one of the factors in excluding the confes-
sion.); State v. Jones, 127 La. 694, 53 So. 959 (1911) (Court held that the
confession was not inadmissible merely because an officer told the prisoner
that he was "taking her to the pen," where the statement was in jest, and
was immediately explained); State v. Turner, 122 La. 371, 47 So. 685 (1908)
(Confession was not inadmissible merely because an interviewer told the
prisoner that he could raise a mob of a hundred men to murder him, and
that there was no possible escape for him, there being no indication of an
intention to resort to mobbing); State v. Robertson, 111 La. 35, 35 So. 375
(1903) (Detention of the accused for a day and a half under some sort of
surveillance in a store into which theives had broken, while not entirely
proper, was not a threat or intimidation which rendered the confession
made by accused inadmissible.); State v. Alphonse, 34 La. Ann. 9, 17 (1882)
(A statement of a police officer to the accused, "Maimee, don't cry; I would
not cry if I was not guilty; you would do better if you told me who the
parties are .... Now, remember, if you know the parties you had better tell
me; I would not suffer for anyone else." was held not to contain a threat.).
See also State v. Thomas, 161 La. 1010, 109 So. 819 (1926); State v. Hogan,
157 La. 287, 102 So. 403 (1924); State v. Young, 52 La. Ann. 478, 27 So. 50
(1899); State v. Albert, 50 La. Ann. 481, 23 So. 609 (1898); State v. Auguste,
50 La. Ann. 488, 23 So. 612 (1898); State v. Revells, 34 La. Ann. 381 (1882).
90. See cases cited in note 89 supra.
91. State v. Revells, 34 La. Ann. 381 (1882) (The court held that a confes-
sion made by an eighteen year old captive while in the hands of a hostile
body of armed men, not known to him as officers, was involuntary.).
Confession held not induced by threat of mob violence: State v. Hogan,
157 La. 287, 289, 102 So. 403, 404 (1924) (" 'The mere fact that accused feared
mob violence when he made a confession does not exclude it where such fear
was not inspired by threats, express or implied,'" quoting from Corpus
Juris); State v. Turner, 122 La. 371, 373-74, 47 So. 685, 686 (1908) (The accused
had been told that the prosecutor [Price] had said that: "'If defendant
should be taken out of prison on a straw bond, he [Price] would not be
responsible for the consequences, and that he [Price] could raise a mob of a
hundred men to murder him, and that there was no possible escape for
him.'" The court said: "What Price had said, if a threat at all, was not an
unqualified threat, and still less a present threat."),
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kill the accused,92 and a threat of prosecution98 have all been held
to render involuntary and inadmissible confessions by persons
who did believe or reasonably can be said to have believed that
such threats would be executed.
Confessions obtained by promises. As a general rule, a prom-
ise precludes the admissibility of a confession if it involves any
assurance was given to him by someone who had the power or
inquiry.9 4 Such a promise usually has reference to the mitigation
of the accused's punishment or his absolute escape from punish-
ment. As with threats, the accused must have been in the position
of believing or of having reasonable grounds to believe that the
inducement was made to him by someone who had the power or
authority to fulfill the promise."5 Promises made after a confes-
sion are held not to affect the admissibility of the confession,
regardless of the nature of the promise.98
A promise of immunity from prosecution has always been
held to be sufficient to deem a confession made in reliance
thereon involuntary.0 7 The typical example of this is that of a
promise extended to an accomplice of persons charged with a
crime to induce him to confess and testify on the state's behalf.98
Even though the alleged accomplice who has made the confession
92. State v. Albert, 50 La. Ann. 481, 23 So. 609 (1898).
93. State v. Vicknair, 52 La. Ann. 1921, 28 So. 273 (1900) and State v.
Nash, 45 La. Ann. 974, 13 So. 265 (1893) held that the threats under these
particular circumstances did not amount to an extortion of the confession
rendering it involuntary, but the court did indicate that the threat of
prosecution in certain instances would render a confession inadmissible.
94. State v. Bruce, 33 La. Ann. 186, 187 (1881) (In this case the court,
quoting from Wharton, said: "'Difficult questions may arise where there is
reason to believe that the confession was made with the hope of compromise,
or of obtaining a lighter sentence. To exclude such confessions arbitrarily,
would exclude almost all confessions. To work an exclusion there must be
shown a causal connection between an authoritative promise and the confes-
sion. If this be not shown, the confession is admissible.").
95. State v. Caldwell, 50 La. Ann. 666, 23 So. 896 (1898); State v. Griffin,
48 La. Ann. 1409, 20 So. 905 (1896); State v. Mims, 43 La. Ann. 532, 9 So. 113
(1891); State v. Revells, 34 La. Ann. 381 (1882); State v. Johnson, 30 La. Ann.
881 (1878); State v. Nelson, 3 La. Ann. 497 (1848).
96. State v. Green, 210 La. 157, 26 So.2d 487 (1946).
97. State v. Alexander, 109 La. 557, 33 So. 600 (1903); State v. Johnson,
30 La. Ann. 881 (1878).
98. See cases cited note 97 supra. In the Alexander case the court held
that because the chief of police had said to the accused that as soon as an
accomplice was caught the latter was going to turn state's evidence and
that, if the accused had anything to tell he had "better tell it now," the
resulting confession was rendered involuntary, the impression made upon the
mind of the accused by this statement being that, after he had turned state's
evidence, he would be freed.
In the Johnson case, the court held that the police officer's holding out
hope that the accused might be used as a state's witness rendered the
resulting confession involuntary.
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later refuses to testify, the courts have held that this will not
render the confession admissible evidence against him 9 A
promise of release from arrest is in the same category'0 0 and has
the same effect as a promise of immunity upon the admissibility
of a confession.
The courts have held that if a confession is induced by a
promise of leniency or clemency, even though complete immunity
was not promised, it is inadmissible.' 0 ' Thus, a confession is not
admissible if made in response to a, promise to "make it lighter"
on the accused if he co'nfesses,102 or to recommend a hfesetence
to the jury instead of -capital punishment.' 03
Confessions made after advising the accused to speak the
truth. The law is well settled that a confession will not be ex-
cluded because the accused was merely advised to speak the
truth. 04 Obviously such a suggestion offers no temptation to an
99. See cases cited note 97 supra.
100. State v. Albert, 50 La. Ann. 481, 23 So. 609 (1898); State v. Van Sachs,
30 La. Ann. 942 (1878) (Promise to release from jail if the stolen property
was returned.).
101. State v. Crittenden, 214 La. 81, 36 So.2d 645 (1948); State v. Ellis,
207 La. 812, 22 So.2d 181 (1945); State v. Newton, 173 La. 382, 137 So. 69
(1931); State v. Bernard, 160 La. 9, 106 So. 656 (1925); State v. Mims, 45 La.
Ann. 532, 9 So. 113 (1891).
102. See cases cited note 101 supra. In State v. Crittenden, 214 La. 81, 85,
36 So.2d 645, 646 (1948), one of the officers had related to the accused the
circumstances of a case where a person had escaped the electric chair by
making a confession. In addition, one of the officers testified, " 'My line of
questioning had to do with telling him that it would be much lighter on him
if he told the truth.'" The court considered these factors in excluding the
confession.
In State v. Ellis, 207 La. 812, 816, 22 So.2d 181, 182 (1945), a written and
signed confession was held inadmissible because of a statement in the
document that said: " 'We have definite proof and if you will tell us It will
be better for you. It will go easier on you.' 
"
In State v. Newton, 173 La. 382, 384, 137 So. 69, 70 (1931), it was found
that in the course of examinations the defendant was told: "If you will tell
the truth I would like to see the court be lenient with you-if anybody gets
leniency I would like for it to be you. ... The confession was excluded.
In State v. Bernard, 160 La. 9, 11, 106 So. 656, 657 (1925), In the examina-
tion of one of the law officers to whom the confession was made, it was
found that the officer had said: "'I asked him to confess if he had stolen
the hog, because it would have been lighter-for him, better for him.'" The
confession was excluded.
103. State v. Scarbrough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928) (It was urged by
the defense that a certain confession was procured by a promise of immunity
from the death penalty. The court found that the confession was made
before the promise was made but indicated that a confession obtained under
the circumstances alleged by the defense would be inadmissible.).
104. In State v. Richard, 223 La. 674, 678-79, 66 So.2d 589, 590-91 (1953),
the deputy sheriff stated to the accused: "'If you are guilty it might be
easier on you [to make a confession], but don't confess anything you are
not guilty of.'" The court said: "It is contended that this statement con-
stituted an inducement or promise calculated to induce a confession by the
defendant. The test in such cases, as stated by this court in State v. Ross,
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innocent man to accuse himself falsely. It is not unusual, however,
for such advice to be coupled with other statements or acts which
contain an implied threat or promise and thereby render the
resulting confession inadmissible. 0 5 The question whether or not
the advice contains an implied threat or promise when accom-
panied by a guarded expression that it would be "better" for the
accused to tell the truth has occasioned some difficulty.10 6 Accord-
ing to our Supreme Court, "the real question in such case is
whether the language used in regard to speaking the truth, when
taken in connection with the attendant circumstances and with
other language spoken in the same or at some prior interview,
shows that the confession was made under the influence of some
threat or promise, for in such case the confession is inadmis-
sible." 107 When the advice was coupled with the stronger state-
212 La. 405, 31 So.2d 842, 847, is: 'Was the inducement of a nature calculated,
under the circumstances, to induce a confession, irrespective of its truth or
falsity?' The inducement here was not of that nature because it contained
a warning to the accused not to confess anything of which he was not
guilty." The confession was admitted.
State v. Phelps, 138 La. 11, 69 So. 856 (1915); State v. Williams, 129 La.
215, 55 So. 769 (1911) (Exhortation to tell the truth, that his "conscience
would be easier," does not exclude a confession); State v. Albert, 50 La. Ann.
481, 23 So. 609 (1898); State v. Caldwell, 50 La. Ann. 666, 23 So. 869 (1898)
(Mere suggestion to accused by a friend, two months after the crime, that
the prosecutor probably would help him out if he told the truth about the
stolen money, did not vitiate the confession.); State v. Meekins, 41 La. Ann.
543, 6 So. 822 (1889) (Advice that "He had better tell the truth"-confession
admitted.); State v. Alphonse, 34 La. Ann. 9 (1882); State v. Kitty, 12 La.
Ann. 805, 810 (1857) (One of the witnesses testified: "'I, then . . . said to
her, that "she must now tell all about it, that it would be better for her to do
so, that it would be better for her to tell the whole truth about the
matter."'" The court held this did not make confession inadmissible.).
105. State v. Ross, 212 La. 405, 31 So.2d 842 (1947); State v. Phelps, 138
La. 11, 69 So. 856 (1915).
106. State v. Ross, 212 La. 405, 419-20, 31 So.2d 842, 846 (1947) ("Thejurisprudence is well settled that a confession will not be excluded because of
a mere exhortation or adjuration to speak the truth, but such exhortation
or adjuration, accompanied by an expression that it would be better for the
accused to tell the truth, has been the subject of many conflicting decisions
throughout this country. To us the real question in such case is whether the
language used in regard to speaking the truth, when taken in connection
with the attendant circumstances and with other language spoken in the
same or at some prior interview, shows that the confession was made under
the influence of some threat or promise, for in such case the confession is
inadmissible."); State v. Williams, 129 La. 215, 217, 55 So. 769 (1911) ("It is
well settled that a confession will not be excluded where there is a mere
exhortation or adjuration to speak the truth. Where an exhortation is
accompanied with an expression that it would be better for the accused
to speak the truth, the authorities are divided. 12 Cyc. 467 and 468. In State
v. Alphonse, 34 La. Ann. 9, and State v. Meekins, 41 La. Ann. 543, 6 So. 822,
it was held that such an expression did not imply a promise or a threat. In
State v. Alexander, 109 La. 557, 33 So. 600, it was held otherwise under a
different state of facts. The true test seems to be: 'Was the inducement of
a nature calculated, under the circumstances,' to induce a confession,
irrespective of its truth or falsity?' Wigmore, Evidence, vol. 1, Sec. 832.").
107. State v. Ross, 212 La. 405, 420, 31 So.2d 842, 846 (1947).
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ment that "the best thing to do is to tell the truth because we
have the evidence against you," the courts have declared the
confession obtained as a result inadmissible. 08
Confession -obtained without cautioning confessor against
later use in court. A confession is not rendered inadmissible by
the fact that the accused was not warned that what he said might
be used against him. 0 9 The rule is the same even when the
confessor was under arrest or in the custody of the police at the
time the confession was given."0 Obviously the failure to give
such advice would have no appreciable effect upon the trust-
worthiness of the confession. The Supreme Court has held that
it is not necessary that the prosecution show that the person con-
fessing was informed of the effect or magnitude of the crime with
which he would be charged as.a condition precedent to admission
in evidence of a confession made by him."'
Confessions elicited by questions. The Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure has an express provision that a "confession
need not be the spontaneous act of the accused and may be
obtained by questions .... ,, 112 The circumstances of the inter-
108. State v. Ross, 212 La. 405, 421, 31 So.2d 842, 847 (1947). See also
State v. Phelps, 138 La. 11, 13, 69 So. 856, 857 (1915) ("The only apparent
reasons for excluding the evidence are that the accused was told that it
would be better for him to tell the truth, and was told by the deputy sheriff
that he, the deputy, 'had the dope on him," when, in reality, the deputy
sheriff had only a suspicion of the boy's guilt.").
109. Texas is the only state in which a statute makes such a warning
necessary. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 727 (Vernon, 1941). For a list of
cases from the various states, see INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 224, n. 217 (3d ed. 1953). Louisiana cases include: State v.
Alleman, 218 La. 821, 51 So.2d 83 (1950); State v. Byrd, 214 La. 713, 38 So.2d
395 (1949); State v. Burks, 196 La. 374, 199 So. 220 (1940); State v. Terrell,
175 La. 758, 144 So. 488 (1932); State v. Smith, 156 La. 818, 101 So. 209 (1924);
State v. Birbiglia, 149 La. 4, 88 So. 533 (1921); State v. Doyle, 146 La. 973, 84
So. 315 (1920); State v. McGuire, 146 La. 49, 83 So. 374 (1919); State v. Canton,
131 La. 255, 59 So. 202 (1912); State v. Besancon, 128 La. 85, 54 So. 480 (1911);
State v. Hogan, 117 La. 863, 42 So. 352 (1906); State v. Rugero, 117 La. 1040,
42 So. 495 (1906).
110. State v. Byrd, 214 La. 713, 38 So.2d 395 (1949); State v. Burks, 196
La. 374, 199 So. 220 (1940); State v. Terrell, 175 La. 758, 114 So. 488 (1932);
State v. Doyle, 146 La. 973, 84 So. 315 (1920); State v. McGuire, 146 La. 49,
83 So. 374 (1919).
111. State v. Davis, 162 La. 500, 110 So. 733 (1926) (statement that the
person whom the confessor had stabbed had died).
112. LA. R.S. § 15:453 (1950): "A confession need not be the spontaneous
act of the accused and may be obtained by means of questions and
answers." Confessions are not involuntary because drawn out by questions
propounded by the prosecutor [State v. Turner, 122 La. 371, 47 So. 685 (1908);
State v. Tazwell, 30 La. Ann. 884 (1878)], or by the policemen or other officers
holding accused in custody or arresting him [State v. Doyle, 146 La. 973,
84 So. 315 (1920); State v. Hardy, 142 La. 1061, 78 So. 116 (1918); State v.
Hogan, 117 La. 863, 42 So. 352 (1906); State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 24
So. 329 (1898); State v. Auguste, 50 La. Ann. 488, 23 So. 612 (1898); State v.
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rogation, however, must be taken into consideration in deter-
mining whether the confession was voluntary. 1 13 Questioning
may sometimes be so vigorous and persistent that tle Yesuiting
confession would be considered the product of compulsion. 1 4
The fact that questions are phrased in such form as to assume
the guilt of the accused does not affect the voluntariness of the
resulting confession.115
Sundry exhortations. The cases indicate that it is merely a
question of degree what remarks to the accused will result in the
McGee, 36 La. Ann. 206 (1884); State v. Alphonse, 34 La. Ann. 9 (1882); State
v. Mulholland, 16 La. Ann. 376 (1861)], or by the district attorney [State v.
Murphy, 154 La. 190, 97 So. 397 (1923); State v. Canton, 131 La. 255, 59 So.
202 (1912)], or by the district judge [State v. Chambers, 45 La. Ann. 36, 11
So. 944 (1892)]. In the case involving the judge the court said that the
conduct of the district judge in visiting accused in jail and interrogating him
cannot be approved, but since the answers were freely given they are
admissible.
113. State v. Silsby, 178 La. 663, 152 So. 323 (1933); State v. Scarbrough,
167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928); State v. Seminary, 165 La. 67, 115 So. 370(1927); State v. White, 156 La. 770, 101 So. 136 (1924); State v. Doyle, 146
La. 973, 84 So. 315 (1920); State v. Hardy, 142 La. 1061, 78 So. 116 (1918);
State v. Vicknair, 52 La. Ann. 1921, 28 So. 273 (1900); State v. Auguste, 50
La. Ann. 488, 23 So. 612 (1898); State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 24 So. 329
(1898); State v. Tazwell, 30 La. Ann. 884 (1878).
See also Wicker, Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions,
5 VAND. L. REV. 507, 515 (1952).
114. State v. Crittenden, 214 La. 81, 86, 36 So.2d 645, 647 (1948) ("... any
persistent effort to obtain a confession from a person in custody by repeat-
edly subjecting him to cross-examinations after he has refused to make such
statement is treatment designed by effect on body or mind to compel a
confession of crime." The accused made the confession after being subjected
to repeated questioning over a period of three days and the court considered
this element in excluding the confession.); State v. Newton, 173 La. 382, 137
So. 69 (1931) (The court excluded the confession after considering several
factors, one being the repeated questioning of the accused.); State v.
Roberson, 157 La. 974, 985, 103 So. 283, 287 (1925) (A confession was obtained
from the accused after some three-to-four hours' questioning by the sheriff
and his deputy on the third consecutive day of interrogation. The court
thought that "any persistent effort to obtain a statement from a person in
custody, by repeatedly subjecting him to cross-examination after he has
refused to make such a statement, is 'treatment designed by effect on body
or mind to compel a confession of crime'; and that a confession so obtained
cannot be used against an accused."); State v. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 54 So. 356(1911); State v. Albert, 50 La. Ann. 481, 485, 23 So. 609, 611 (1898) (In refusing
as evidence a confession obtained after repeated interrogation, the court
said: "For the purpose of ferreting out crime, the law provides a grand
jury, with inquisitorial power .. ").
115. State v. Turner, 122 La. 371, 47 So. 685 (1908) (Owner of a stolen
horse visited the jail at the defendant's request, assumed the accused was
guilty, and told him that if he had caught him on the night of the theft
he would have shot him. This did not deprive the accused's confession of its
voluntary character.); State v. McGee, 36 La. Ann. 206, 209 (1884) (Confession
made in response to a question by the deputy sheriff, " 'Why did you let the
old cook-woman see you?'" was voluntary.); State v. Tazwell, 30 La. Ann. 884(1878) (Confession was not involuntary because made in response to the
question whether or not the accused wanted to tell all he knew about
stealing the prosecutor's corn.).
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exclusion of his confession, but the determining question seems
to be whether or not an implied inducement, either by way of
threat or promise, can be found in them.116 For example, the
statement: "Now remember, if you know the parties you had
better tell me; I would not suffer for anyone else" was held not
to render the confession inadmissible for having been involun-
tarily obtained."1  But the following expressions, addressed to
to the accused, have been held to render his confession inadmis-
sible: "If I was in your place and was the right man, I would try
and effect a compromise";"18 "Boy, I have got you in the palm of
my hand. You had better confess to me";" 9 "If you have got any-
thing to say, you had better say it now.' 20
PROOF AND EFFECT OF CONFESSIONS
Proof that confession was made. By statute the prosecution
is required to inform the jury in its opening statement that it
intends to offer the confession of the accused in evidence. 12 1 As
116. For a general discussion of the law regarding such expressions, see
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 277 et seq., §§ 838-39.
117. State v. Alphonse, 34 La. Ann. 9, 17 (1882).
118. State v. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 1079, 54 So. 356, 357 (1911) (The court, in
excluding the confession, said: "The advice of the sheriff, under these
circumstances, that it would be better for him to compromise, or, in other
words, to confess ('to compromise' could not, under the circumstances, mean
anything else than to confess, since a confession was all the man had to
offer to the state by way of compromise) must have sunk deep into his
mind .... ).
119. State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 980, 41 So.2d 848, 850 (1949). Moreover,
the defendant testified that the police officer had ". . . told me that if the
dirt [from the scene of the crime] turned out to be like the dirt in the
paper that he had [just raked from the pants of the accused by the state
officer], that I could give my soul to 'God and you know what to me.'" The
confession was excluded. 215 La. 974, 988, 41 So.2d 848, 853 (1949).
120. State v. Alexander, 109 La. 557, 558, 33 So. 600 (1903).
121. LA. R.S. § 15:333 (1950). See also State v. Sanford, 218 La. 38, 47, 48
So.2d 272, 275 (1950) ("The district attorney is not required to either read the
confession to the jury or to detail the substance thereof" in his opening
statement in a prosecution for aggravated rape, after stating that the
confession is to be introduced into evidence. The court also pointed out
that the district attorney is not required in his opening statement to state
that the confession was free and voluntary.); State v. Ward, 187 La. 585,
175 So. 69 (1937); State v. Bishop, 179 La. 378, 154 So. 30 (1934) (District
attorney in his opening statement informed the jury that he expected to
establish crime of robbery by facts which would include voluntary confession
but failed to inform the jury whether the confession was made orally or in
writing. The court thought that the district attorney had followed the
"letter and spirit" of LA. R.S. § 15:333 (1950) and held the confession
admissible.); State v. Silsby, 176 La. 727, 146 So. 684 (1933).
See also the following cases, in which the entire confession was read by
the district attorney in his opening statement: State v. Wilson, 217 La. 470,
476, 46 So.2d 738, 741 (1950) (The court, citing State v. Cannon, said: "A
conviction and sentence will not be set aside where the district attorney
reads a confession to the jury in his opening statement if the confession
is subsequently admitted in evidence."); State v. Cannon, 184 La. 514, 520,
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indicated above,12 2 the state must then prove to the judge beyond
reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The
question whether or not the confession was in fact made by the
accused is for the jury to decide.12 3
Numerous difficult problems may arise in the proof of a con-
fession. For example, is parol evidence admissible to prove an
oral confession stenographically reduced to writing, signed by the
defendant and available to the prosecution? Is the unsigned
stenographic transcript of an oral confession admissible in proof
of the oral confession? Two principles would seem to govern in
this area. Article 436 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that "the best evidence which from the nature of the
case must be supposed to exist, and which is in a party's control,
must be produced." Article 437 provides that "the contents of a
document may be proved by parol if its loss or destruction be
shown, or if it is in the possession of the adverse party and he
fails to produce it after reasonable notice." If an oral confession
has been stenographically reduced to writing and signed by
the defendant, it may be possible to prove, as entirely distinct
confessions, either the words spoken by the accused or the con-
tents of the writing which he signed. Clearly, if an attempt to
prove the contents of the writing is made, Article 437 applies and
the writing must be produced if available. But what if the pros-
ecution seeks to avoid production of the writing by contending
that it wishes to establish the oral confession by means of parol
evidence? There would seem to be three possible approaches to
this problem. The court might hold, Professor Wigmore to the
contrary notwithstanding, 124 that the oral confession "merged"
into the signed transcript of it, that is, that the upshot of
the transcription of the oral confession was one confession, not
two. Therefore, evidence of, the oral confession would not be
admissible. On the assumption that there are two confessions, a
wriften one and an oral one, the court might consider the written
transcript the best evidence of the oral confession and hold that,
under Article 436, the signed transcript must be produced. On the
other hand, the court might hold that the testimony of witnesses
166 So. 485, 487 (1936) (The district attorney read "the defendant's confession
to the jury before it was offered or admitted in evidence. This would
certainly have been reversible error if the confession, when offered, had been
excluded by the court, but in this case it was admitted. Hence defendant's
case was not prejudiced thereby. Courts are not warranted in reversing
verdicts except where error prejudicial to the defense occurs.").
122. See page 651 supra.
123. State v. Hughes, 155 La. 271, 99 So. 217 (1924).
124. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 648, § 1328.
VOL. XIV
COMMENTS
present when the oral confession was made is the best evidence. 125
The transcript may have been made by an unskilled stenographer
and reliable, alert witnesses to the confession might be available
to testify. In'that event, Article 436 would require that their
testimony be produced. These questions seem never to have
been presented to the Supreme Court.
The admissibility of. parol evidence of an oral confession
reduced by a stenographer to a writing never signed by the
defendant and the admissibility of the writing itself in proof of
an oral confession may be discussed together. In 1912, the Supreme
Court, holding admissible parol evidence of the defendant's
testimony (not amounting to a confession) at a coroner's inquest,
thought that "[w]hile the testimony, as reduced to writing by
the coroner, may be the most reliable evidence of what the testi-
mony was, it is not the best evidence, in the sense of the rule of
best evidence." 126 In 1936, the court was of the opinion that "with-
out his signature to the [transcript of defendant's oral] confes-
sion, evidencing that it is his, the only way that it may be proven
is by oral evidence." 12 Insofar as this dictum suggests that the
unsigned transcript of an oral confession is not admissible in
proof of the confession, it must be considered nullified by a 1938
decisionl'2 s holding such a transcript admissible, at least in sup-
port of parol evidence of the confession. In 1953, the Supreme
Court ,went further and held 12 9 that the unsigned transcript of
the defendant's oral statements (apparently not amounting to a
confession) must be produced as the best evidence of those state-
ments under Article 436. Obviously, no clear rule-of-thumb can
125. State v. Bishop, 179 La. 378, 154 So. 30 (1934); State v. Terrell, 175
La. 758, 144 So. 488 (1932); State v. McCullough, 168 La. 161, 121 So. 609
(1929); State v. Natcisse, 133 La. 584, 63 So. 182 (1913); State v. Desroches,
48 La. Ann. 428, 19 So. 250 (1896); State v. Avery, 31 La. Ann. 181 (1879).
126. State v. Lazarone, 130 La. 1, 6, 57 So. 532, 534 (1912) (Although the
statement involved in this case was not a confession, the rule would no doubt
be the same for a confession.). See also State v. Bailey, 146 La. 624, 638, 83
So. 854, 859 (1920) ("... it is true that, if defendant had made but one
confession, and it had been reduced to writing, the written instrument would
be the best- evidence of the matters confessed; but that was not what
happened. The confession offered by the prosecution- purports to include
all that was said on that particular occasion, and was not reduced to
writing. As to it, therefore, the best evidence was the testimony of those by
whom it was heard; and that testimony was none the less admissible because
defendant made another confession, at another time and place, which was
reduced to writing.").
127. State v. Terrell, 175 La. 758, 770, 144 So. 488, 492 (1932).
128. State v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938).
129. State v. McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So.2d 574 (1953).
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be extracted from this line of decisions. Indeed, this entire area
of problems awaits clarification by the legislature or the court.180
An interesting development in the method of proving confes-
sions in Louisiana is a recent decision that a confession may be
proved by playing a wire recording of it to the jury.131 The deci-
sion is in accord with the majority of American courts to which
the question has been presented. 18 2
130. For other interesting questions presented to the Supreme Court, see
State v. Comery, 214 La. 245, 250, 36 So.2d 781, 782 (1948) ("It appears that
the district attorney made some notes, or a narrative, while he and the
sheriff were questioning the accused, which were given to a stenographer
to be typewritten. After the stenographer had prepared the typewritten
instrument, it was read to the accused in the presence of the district
attorney, the sheriff and a deputy sheriff, and was signed by the accused.
The lower court took the position that the instrument, read to the accused
and signed by her, was the original confession. We think the trial judge's
ruling was correct. . . ."); State v. Murphy, 154 La. 190, 201, 97 So. 397, 401
(1923) ("Although, as above stated, their confessions were taken down by a
stenographer, the lower court refused to compel the district attorney, when
requested to do so by counsel for the accused, to produce the stenographic
report, either for examination or use by the defense, or for submission to
to the jury, for the reason, as stated, by the court, counsel for the state
claimed it had been incorrectly transcribed and contained many errors.
Considering the circumstances . . ., and in view of the exclusion of the
stenographic report of the confessions, which was unquestionably important
and material, not only upon the point as to what was actually said by the
accused, but as to such evidences as it might have borne as to the manner
and methods used in having it made, we think the court erred in admitting
the confessions. We are not to be understood as meaning by this that,
if the report had been produced, it would have made the confessions any
the less objectionable; it is simply mentioned as a circumstance tending to
show the insufftciency of the state's proof In attempting to establish that they
were voluntarily made.").
131. State v. Alleman, 218 La. 821, 831, 51 So.2d 83, 86 (1950) ("Counsel
contends that to permit a wire recording as such to be admitted In evidence
would be to open the door to possible fraud and illegal evidence, in that
substitutions of the recording are possible .... The fact that the statement
of the accused was taken by means of a wire recording, in itself, in our
opinion in no way affects the admissibility of the statement so taken. This
question has never before been presented to this court. However, the courts
of other states have had occasion to pass on the same or similar questions,
and in every instance, insofar as we have ascertained, have concluded that
statements taken in such a manner were admissible in evidence [citing
numerous cases]. . . . The question of fraud or substitution is one for the
trial judge in each particular case."). The court also said: "The State
concedes that the accused did not know that the questions and answers
were being recorded, but this fact would not, in our opinion, make the
statement, which was freely and voluntarily given, inadmissible in evidence
as a confession." 218 La. 821, 829, 51 So.2d 83, 86 (1950).
132. For a list of cases see INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 228, n. 226 (3d ed. 1953).
Wigmore recommends the promulgation of a Rule of Court to the
effect that no confession made to the police or a prosecuting officer shall
be received in evidence unless it has been recorded on sound film. He believes
that such a requirement would eliminate most of the current abuses found
in continuous interrogation by the police. According to him, an apparatus
for recording confessions can be obtained for five hundred dollars or less-
"a sum within the budget of any police department." 3 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 851a (Supp. 1951).
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Confession must be given in entirety. The Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure requires that any confession sought to be
used must be used in its entirety.13 3 "Entirety" embraces the
whole of the statement or conversation containing the confession
and includes any exculpatory or self-serving declarations con-
nected with it in any manner. 13 4 If the parts relied on to establish
the guilt of the prisoner are received, the explanations with
which they are accompanied should obviously not be rejected. A
full explanation might establish the complete justification for the
crime committed. The Supreme Court has pointed out, however,
that it must appear clearly that the exculpatory or self-serving
statements were made in the same conversation as the confession
sought to be introduced and not on other occasions or to other
witnesses. 135
133. LA. R.S. § 15:450 (1950): "Every confession . . . sought to be used
against any one must be used in its entirety, so that the person to be
affected thereby may have the benefit of any exculpation or explanation
that the whole statement may afford." For cases on this point, see State v.
Birbiglia, 149 La. 4, 88 So. 533 (1921); State v. Donelon, 45 La. Ann. 744, 12
So. 922 (1893); State v. Hughes, 29 La. Ann. 514, 516 (1877) ("We are not
disposed to relax this salutory rule [that a confession must be used in
entirety]; for although such evidence,owhen we have satisfactory guarantees
of its accuracy, may amount to the strongest proof, yet in a majority of
instances, owing to infirmities of memory, or to inattention, or misunder-
standing in those called to state conversations with others, it is not very
trustworthy. It would be utterly unreliable if fragmentary portions of
conversations were. received, for then a man might be made to say directly
the contrary of what he did say."); State v. Isaac, 3 La. Ann. 359, 361 (1848)
("When confessions of guilt are given in evidence, the whole must be taken
together. If the parts relied on to establish the guilt of the prisoner be
received, the explanations with which they were accompanied cannot be
rejected. Although all the parts of the confession are not entitled to equal
weight, the whole must be submitted to the jury, who are to determine,
under all the circumstances, how much of the entire statement is worthy
of belief.").
134. See cases cited in note 133 supra. In the Isaac case, 3 La. Ann. 359,
361 (1848), the court said, "The witness testified: 'That the accused came to
him the morning after the affray, and told him that he had killed the slave
Jim, and commenced justifying the act, when the witness stopped him, and
told him that he intended to deliver him over to be punished.' The confession
appears to have been voluntary, but should have been excluded on the
ground that it was interrupted and never completed.. . . In the present
instance, the prisoner was not permitted to make a full statement. It is
evident that he intended to state circumstances in justification, which the
witness refused to hear. A full explanation might have established a complete
justification, and the narrative might have been so consistent and probable
as to command the belief of the jury. Having been deprived of the benefit
of the explanations with which he intended to accompany his admission,
and which, if they had been made, would have been admissible in evidence,
justice requires that his incomplete disclosure, consisting only of the fact
unfavorable to himself, should not go to the jury."
135. State v. Jones, 47 La. Ann. 1524, 1531, 18 So. 515, 518 (1895) (... he
[the trial judge] says that, 'if these declarations had been made at the time
that the confession was made, then they should have been admitted as part
of said confession, but, having been made long subsequent thereto, they were
clearly objectionable, and they were, therefore, excluded.' It is quite evident
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Although the code provides that the confession should be
received in its entirety, an important judicial modification has
been placed on this rule. There are numerous cases holding that
the inability of a witness to remember the entire conversation
containing the confession does not make him incompetent to
testify regarding what he does remember.13 6 Thus, where it ap-
that these statements constituted no part of the confession .. "); State v.
Johnson, 35 La. Ann. 968, 969 (1883) ("The rule is undoubted that, when
confessions or statements of an accused are offered, they must go in all
together; but that only applies to declarations made at one time or having
some connection with each other. Here we find no connection whatever
between the admitted confessions and the rejected declarations, the former
having been made six weeks after the latter.").
136. State v. Jugger, 217 La. 687, 709, 47 So.2d 46, 54 (1950) ("While
Stewart was unable to remember all that had been said, he was able to
state the substance of the confession. This suffices and its admission in
evidence was proper."); State v. McCullough, 168 La. 161, 164, 121 So. 609, 610
(1929) ("The witness was present during the entire time the conversation was
had, when the confession was made, and experienced no difficulty in hearing
what was said. The witness testified that, while he did not remember the
conversation verbatim, he remembered the substance of it, and, after he had
narrated what purports to be the substance of the confession, he said that
what he had testified to was the substance of everything that was said
at the time. While some of his answers to questions suggest that possibly
he did not remember all that was said, yet his evidence as a whole
conveys the impression that he did. We think that the witness qualified
sufficiently to testify to the confession. It is enough to enable a witness
to testify to a confession that he is able to state the substance of it.");
State v. Natcisse, 133 La. 584,_ 63 So. 182 (1913); State v. Gianfala, 113
La. 463, 470, 37 So. 30, 32 (1904) ("We do not think, in order that evidence
of the confession may be admissible, that it is necessary for the witness
to repeat the conversation with severe exactness. It is sufficient if the
witness repeats, in the main, all that was said, and if it be evident to
the trial judge that no prejudice is done by a slip of the memory here and
there in regard to what was said."); State v. Kellogg, 104 La. 580, 29 So. 285
(1901); State v. Desroches, 48 La. Ann. 428, 429, 19 So. 250 (1896) ("The
court certifies that the witness said that he could not repeat, verbatim, all
that the accused uttered, but that he could repeat the substance of his
utterances. While, in order to be admissible, such evidence must not be
fragmentary portions of a conversation, not the less an exact recital of the
words is not required."); State v. Madison, 47 La. Ann. 30, 33, 16 So. 566, 567
(1895) (purporting to quote from State v. Thomas, 28 La. Ann. 827 (1876), the
court said: "'A confession by a person charged with a crime is not neces-
sarily inadmissible because the person to show it was made testifies that he
does not remember all the confession, but only some of the particular
points thereof'."); State v. Avery, 31 La. Ann. 181 (1879) ("The witnesses
who testified to the confessions of the accused stated, in effect, that they
could not and would not undertake to swear to the precise words of the
prisoner; but that they did remember the substance of his declarations. This
was sufficient. To require more would be to effectually close the mouths of
conscientious men when called on as witnesses to testify to such confes-
sions."); State v. Hughes, 29 La. Ann. 514 (1877); State v. Thomas, 28 La.
Ann. 827, 828 (1876) (The court, in holding that the confession made by the
accused to an individual, is admissible in evidence even if the witness does
not remember the whole confession, said: "The objection went to the effect
of the testimony, and not to its admissibility.").
When confessions are in writing, apparently the same rule will apply.
State v. Brasseaux, 163 La. 686, 698, 112 So. 650, 654 (1927) ("Even in
dictation of last wills and testaments, the most solemn and formal of all
the legal instruments known, it is not necessary that a notary public in this
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pears to the court that the witness remembers the substance of
the conversation, he is allowed to testify as to what he remembers,
even though he cannot recall everything that-was said. The reason
for such a modification is obvious. Precise reproduction is often
impossible. It is the substance, not the form, of the confession
that is material. The fact that the witness is unable to remember
the exact words of the accused may be considered by the jury
in its weighing of the evidence.'3s
Instruction to jury and scope of jury consideration. After
the confession has been admitted in evidence and placed before
the jury, the question arises what instruction should be given
by the judge and what should be the scope of the jury's considera-
tion. Is an accused entitled to have the jury instructed that it
must determine whether or not the confession is voluntary and
accept or reject it accordingly, or is the jury to be instructed
that they are to accept the confession and determine only the
weight to be given it under the circumstances shown? There
are no clear Louisiana decisions on this point. There are cases
holding, however, that the question of whether a confession is
involuntary and thus inadmissible in evidence is a matter to be
determined by the court alone. 138 Although evidence regarding
voluntariness may be repeated in the presence of the jury, it is
admitted for the sole purpose of aiding them in determining the
weight to be given to the evidence offered to prove the confes-
sion.13 9
state take down the language of the testator in ipsissimis verbis; the
substance of the disposition being all that is required, by law, to be reduced
to writing by that officer. This is the rule also in the matter of written
confessions, ex necessitate rei. Any other rule would defeat, in a very large
measure, the admissibility of confessions in criminal cases, as it is not
practical for any witness to repeat, or to inscribe word for word, any
incriminatory statement made by a defendant unless such statement should
be so brief that it may be readily recalled or written in the precise language
in which it has been made.").
137. See cases cited in note 136 supra.
138. State v. Jugger, 217 La. 687, 711, 47 So.2d 46, 55 (1950) ("It is the
established jurisprudence that the proper time for determining whether a
confession is free and voluntary is when the state is making out its case
preparatory to offering it in evidence."); State v. Wilson, 217 La. 470, 485,
46 So.2d 738, 743 (1950) ("The admissibility of a confession is determined by
the trial judge and not the jury. The effect of the confession is to be
determined by the jury after it has been held by the trial judge to be
admissible."); State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 41 So.2d 848 (1949); State v.
Thomas, 208 La. 548, 23 So.2d 212 (1945); State v. Lanthier, 201 La. 844, 850,
10 So.2d 638, 640 (1942) ("The admissibility of a confession is a question
which the trial judge must decide and not the jury. Jurors pass upon the
effect of the confession after it has been held by the trial judge to be
admissible as a result of the State laying the proper foundation for the
introduction thereof."); State v. Doiron, 150 La. 550, 90 So. 920 (1922).
139. State v. Doiron, 150 La. 550, 552, 90 So. 920, 921 (1922): "When a
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Another question arising in connection with the judge's
charge to the jury is whether or not any instruction should be
given regarding the weight to be attached to the confession.
Although one decision indicates that it would probably not have
been error for the district judge to instruct the jury, as he refused
to do, that the confession "should be received with great caution,"
the court in that case said it agreed with the judge's charge to the
jury that "a free and voluntary confession by a person accused
of crime, is evidence against him; and it is with the jury to
attach to a confession, that weight to which it is entitled." 140 The
probative weight of a confession must therefore be determined
by the jury in the same fashion as they determine the weight of
confession is offered and objection is made, as in this case, it is the burden
and duty of the state to show the circumstances under which it was made,
(citing cases] ... that is, that it was voluntary; and this must be done, when
said objection is made, in the presence of the jury, in order that they may
have the benefit of such circumstances to determine the weight to be given
to the evidence to prove the confession. As before stated, we can see no
reason why the trial judge cannot send the jury out, and first determine
for himself the question of the admissibility of the alleged, confession, in
order that, If he decides to exclude it, the jury may not be affected by any
prejudicial matter preliminarily brought out. But where he does determine
that it Is admissible, the accused is entitled to have all the circumstances
go before the jury as a preliminary matter, for they have the right to
determine the weight of all evidence, and to say whether statements alleged
to have been voluntarily made, were in fact so made, and, if not, to disregard
them. What is done out of the presence of the jury in a criminal trial, Is
as if it had not taken place at all."
Justice O'Niell, in a concurring opinion, 150 La. 550, 554, 90 So. 920, 922
(1922), disagreed with the court on this point: "Of course, when a confession
is offered In evidence against a party on trial for crime, the state must.first
prove that the confession was made freely and voluntarily. It was proven
by the testimony of Dr. Martin, taken out of the presence of the jury, that
the confession made to him was a free and voluntary confession. When the
doctor was called as a witness before the jury, to relate the confession,
and defendant's counsel objected on the ground that a foundation had not
been laid for the introduction of the confession, the counsel did not offer
to question the doctor on that subject. There was the opportunity to let thejury know the circumstances under which the confession was made. The
manifest reason why the doctor was not examined on the subject by defend-
ant's counsel, in presence of the jury, was that defendant's counsel had
heard the testimony given by the doctor out of the presence of the jury, and
knew that the confession was a free and voluntary one. In fact, the first
question asked the doctor when he was called before the jury, by the district
attorney, was whether the confession was free and voluntary, and it was to
that question alone that defendant's counsel objected. There was no cause
or reason whatever for the objection, and the court very properly overruled
It."
140. State v. Bunger, 14 La. Ann. 461, 464 (1859). See also State v. Gunter,
30 La. Ann. 536, 537 (1878) (The lower court had charged the jury "that they
were the judges of the law and the evidence; that they could believe the
confession of the prisoner as true or false; that they had the right to
believe a part and reject the other if they saw fit, or reject the whole; the
truthfulness or falsity of all evidence, and the weight to be attached to it,
being left exclusively to them." This charge was upheld.).
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any other evidence. 141 This includes taking into consideration
all the circumstances of the case and considering all the tes-
timony given. The rule that a confession is to be considered in
its entirety does not compel the jury to give the same credence
to every part of it.142 They may attach such credit to any part
of it as they deem it worthy of, and may reject any portion of it
which they do not believe. The circumstances surrounding the
case must determine how much of the confession will be believed
and how much will be rejected by the jury.143
Weight and effect of confessions. The general rule in Loui-
siana is that an accused party's confession does not alone justify
a conviction.144 There must be other evidence that a crime has
been committed. 145 The question what amount of proof is neces-
sary to establish the corpus delicti of the crime is not settled, but
in one case the Supreme Court indicated that such evidence need
not be sufficient in itself to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the crime was committed. 46 According to the tenor of that
case, the evidence of the corpus delicti is sufficient if, when taken
together with the confession, the jury is satisfied beyond a reason-
able doubt that the crime was committed and that it was the
defendant who committed it.
141. See cases cited in note 140 supra. See also State v. Sears, 220 La. 103,
55 So.2d 881 (1951).
142. State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 41 So.2d 848 (1949); State v. Johnson,
47 La. Ann. 1225, 17 So. 789 (1895); State v. Gunter, 30 La. Ann. 536 (1878);
State v. Wedemeyer, 11 La. Ann. 49 (1856).
143. See cases cited in note 142 supra.
144. State v. Calloway, 196 La. 496, 506, 199 So. 403, 406 (1940) (Although
citing only one Louisiana case (State v. Morgan, Infra), the court cited
numerous decisions from other states, and said: "It is conceded that the
jurisprudence of this State is well settled that the uncorroborated confession
of an accused will not of itself sustain a conviction but that there must be
other proof of the corpus delicti." In this case the defendant was charged
with "assault with intent to rape." He contended that he should have been
charged only with "assault, beating, and wounding" as there was no complete
proof that he attempted to rape the victim. The court considered all the
circumstances and concluded: "It is our opinion that the corpus delicti of
the crime was sufficiently proved by evidence independent of the confes-
sion."); State v. Morgan, 157 La. 962, 964, 103 So. 278, 279 (1925) (Appeal
from carnal knowledge conviction. The prosecutrix had retracted her
previous statements and the district attorney, knowing she would testify
in favor of the defendant, refused to call her as a witness. It was admitted
by the district attorney that no evidence tending to establish the crime
was introduced, except the confessions of the accused, which confessions
were wholly relied on by the state for a conviction. The court, after citing
numerous cases from other states, said: "We prefer, however, to follow the
rule, as definitely established-as we take it-by a great majority of the
states, to the effect that an accused party cannot be legally convicted on his
own uncorroborated confession without proof that a crime has been com-
mitted; in other words, without proof of the corpus delicti.").
145. See cases cited in note 144 supfa.
146. State v. Calloway, 196 La. 496, 199 So. 403 (1940).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE DiscOVERED AS RESULT OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION
Evidence discovered as the result of a confession is not ren-
dered incompetent because the confession itself was found in-
admissible. 14T There is considerable diversity of opinion, however,
as to whether or not the confession itself should be admitted
when part of it has been confirmed by subsequent facts.148 Under
the theory that involuntary confessions are excluded because
their reliability is doubtful, it would seem that where a search
is made and facts are discovered which confirm a confession in
material points, the confession could be considered trustworthy.
Yet, even under these circumstances there is a possibility of un-
reliability, for the accused may know of the crime and of the
location of certain evidence without having committed the crime.
Under the fair law enforcement policy, there is no doubt that
the confession would be excluded even if it were confirmed by
the discovery of subsequent facts. Courts throughout the country
have taken three different approaches to this problem. 4 9 In some
jurisdictions, courts admit all of a confession when part of it has
been confirmed by the subsequent discovery of facts. 50 In others,
"so much of the confession as relates strictly to the fact discovered
by it" is received.' 15 In still others, even though part of it has
been confirmed, no part of the confession is received. 52 Louisiana
has taken this third approach. 158 Whether or not it is permissible
for the prosecution to show that the discovery was made as a
result of information given by the accused is questionable. Some
jurisdictions admit evidence to that effect,5 4 and two early Loui-
siana decisions indicate that this was at one time the rule in this
state. 55 In the light of a more recent decision, however, it is
147. Where the accused, in confessing, points out or tells where the
stolen property is [State v. George, 15 La. Ann. 145 (1860)] or where he gives
a clue to other evidence which proves the case [State v. Garvey, 28 La. Ann.
925 (1876)], all such discovered evidence is admissible.
148. 3 WGMORE, EVIDENCE 337 et seq., §§ 856-58.
149. Ibid. See footnotes to these sections for cases from the various
jurisdictions.
150. Id. at 338-39, § 857, n. 1.
151. Id. at 339, § 857, n. 2.
152. Id. at 339 et seq., § 858, n. 2.
153. State v. Gebbia, 121 La. 1083, 47 So. 32 (1908); State v. Garvey, 28
La. Ann. 925 (1876); State v. George, 15 La. Ann. 145 (1860).
154. 3 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE 339 et seq., § 858, n. 2.
155. State v. Garvey, 28 La. Ann. 925, 927 (1876) ("Whether the finding
of the brickbat, stave-pile, and 'other facts' corroborated the alleged
confession or not, is immaterial in considering the admissibility of the
confession. These facts might have been proved, and even that they were
discovered in consequence of information received from the accused, without
making a confession unduly obtained admissible."); State v. George, 15 La.
Ann. 145, 146 (1860) ("So much of the declarations of the slave George, as led
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doubtful that the Louisiana courts would take this position at
the present time. 5 6
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to the discovery of the stolen goods, was properly received; but his confes-
sion of guilt, procured through inducements held out to him by those
who had arrested him, and had him in their custody, should have been
excluded.").
156. State v. Simpson, 157 La. 614, 620, 102 So. 810, 812 (1925) ("Two
Louisiana cases are cited to sustain the proposition that, when a person
suspected of a crime has been compelled by threats or violence to disclose
where evidence of the crime may be found, his statement or disclosure, as
well as the evidence found in consequence of the disclosure, is admissible in
evidence against him, tvz.: State v. Slave George, 15 La. Ann. 146; and State
v. Gebbia, 121 La. 1083, 47 So. 32. In neither case was there any mention
of the distinction between admitting in evidence the facts found in con-
sequence of an involuntary statement of the accused party and admitting
in evidence the involuntary statement or disclosure itself. What was said
in that respect in the case of the slave, George, was obiter dictum, because
the verdict and sentence were annulled for the reason that the judge had
allowed the involuntary confession of the slave to be admitted in evidence.
The doctrine stated in Gebbia's Case (page 1107 of the report), that facts
discovered in consequence of a confession improperly obtained are admis-
sible in evidence, was correct, as an abstract principle of law, and apart
from the recitals in the bill of exceptions.").
